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Notes 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT LIMITS OF 
FACIAL RECOGNITION AT THE BORDER  
EMMANUEL ABRAHAM PEREA JIMENEZ† 
ABSTRACT 
  On any given day, hundreds of thousands of people enter the United 
States through ports of entry along the Mexican and Canadian borders. 
At the same time, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
seizes millions of dollars’ worth of contraband entering the United 
States annually. Under the border-search exception, border officials 
can perform routine, warrantless searches for this contraband, based 
on no suspicion of a crime, without violating the Fourth Amendment. 
But as DHS integrates modern technology into its enforcement efforts, 
the question becomes how these tools fit into the border-search 
doctrine. Facial recognition technology (“FRT”) is a prime example. 
To date, no court—and few legal scholars—have addressed how the 
Fourth Amendment would regulate the use of FRT at the border. This 
Note begins to fill that gap. 
  This Note contends that, after Carpenter v. United States, the 
Fourth Amendment places at least some limits on the use of FRT at the 
border. Given the absence of caselaw, this Note uses a hypothetical 
border search to make three core claims. First—distinguishing between 
face verification and face identification—this Note argues that face 
identification constitutes a Fourth Amendment “search” only when the 
images displayed to a border official reveal “the privacies of life.” 
Second, because of its invasive nature, this form of face identification 
is a nonroutine border search and is unconstitutional when conducted 
without reasonable suspicion. Lastly, this Note concludes that a border 
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official’s reasonable suspicion must be linked to a crime that bears 
some nexus to the purposes underlying the border-search exception. 
INTRODUCTION 
At the San Ysidro Port of Entry, nearly one hundred thousand 
people cross the border into San Diego, California, on any given day.1 
Most will pass through primary inspection quickly and enter the United 
States without incident.2 Some are referred to secondary inspection 
and remain at the border until a U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(“CBP”)3 officer allows them to enter the country.4 Regardless of how 
long they remain at the border, those travelers are being monitored. 
CBP’s many surveillance towers, drones, and motion sensors are likely 
tracking their movements.5 Devices known as “IMSI catchers” may be 
actively gathering their cell-site location information (“CSLI”) and 
may even be collecting their text and voice messages too.6  
In addition to these surveillance methods, facial recognition 
technology7 (“FRT”) is an emerging technology that will, once fully 
implemented, allow CBP to identify each traveler passing through San 
 
 1. San Ysidro Land Port of Entry Fact Sheet, GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.gsa.gov/
cdnstatic/Overarching%20San%20Ysidro%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20Dec%2011%202019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L2N9-7UGA] (last updated Dec. 11, 2019).  
 2. See RUTH ELLEN WASEM, JENNIFER LAKE, LISA SEGHETTI, JAMES MONKE & STEPHEN 
VIÑA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32399, BORDER SECURITY: INSPECTIONS PRACTICES, POLICIES, 
AND ISSUES 10–11 (2005). All travelers entering the United States must present themselves to a 
Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) officer for an initial, or “primary,” inspection. Id. These 
inspections “usually last[] no longer than a minute.” Id. at 10.  
 3. Not to be confused with the U.S. Border Patrol, which is a component agency of CBP, 
see CBP Organization Chart, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., https://www.cbp.gov/document/
publications/cbp-organization-chart [https://perma.cc/M7CF-K95E], or U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), which is a partner agency of CBP under the umbrella of the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), see Operational and Support Component, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/operational-and-support-components [https://
perma.cc/H6RH-HWKH]. 
 4. If an officer suspects a traveler is inadmissible or otherwise violating the law, she may 
refer the traveler to a more extensive “secondary” inspection. WASEM ET AL., supra note 2, at 11. 
However, most travelers are not referred to secondary inspection. Id.  
 5. See Shirin Ghaffary, The “Smarter” Wall: How Drones, Sensors, and AI Are Patrolling 
the Border, VOX (Feb. 7, 2020, 8:01 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/16/18511583/smart-
border-wall-drones-sensors-ai [https://perma.cc/V9UR-NRB2] (“Thousands of ground sensors 
are currently in use between ports of entry at the US border,” along with drones, “a favored tool,” 
and surveillance towers).  
 6. Id.  
 7. This Note uses variations of “facial recognition,” such as “facial recognition technology” 
or “facial recognition systems,” interchangeably. 
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Ysidro—and every other port of entry.8 Facial recognition will also give 
CBP officers a window into the most private aspects of travelers’ lives.9 
FRT identifies people through the automated analysis of a person’s 
facial features.10 And in recent years, it has become an increasingly 
common feature of modern life—from facilitating day-to-day tasks like 
unlocking cell phones11 to making consequential decisions about who 
can enter the country.12 The law enforcement benefits are clear.13 But 
as with any new and powerful technology, so are its flaws and potential 
for abuse. FRT is often of questionable accuracy,14 and in the wrong 
hands, it can be a potent tool for social repression.15  
FRT also promises to stretch current constitutional doctrines as 
courts grapple with this rapidly evolving technology. In fact, courts are 
already confronting FRT-related issues in the context of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.16 But so far, courts 
 
 8. See infra Part I.B. 
 9. See infra Part I.B.  
 10. See infra Part I.A. 
 11. See Jason Cipriani, iPhone Face ID Is Pretty Cool. Here’s How It Works and How To Use 
It, CNET (Feb. 5, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/how-to/the-iphone-and-ipads-face-id-
tech-is-pretty-darn-cool-heres-how-it-works-and-how-to-use-it [https://perma.cc/CB64-DNK9] 
(“When it launched Face ID in September 2017, Apple turned your close-up into the key that 
unlocks your iPhone. Since then, Apple has continued to expand the number and type of devices 
with Face ID . . . .”). 
 12. See infra Part I.B.1.  
 13. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2NEbiJZ [https://perma.cc/S9LB-5G89] (“Federal and 
state law enforcement officers . . . had used [a facial recognition] app to help solve shoplifting, 
identity theft, credit card fraud, murder and child sexual exploitation cases.”). Police departments 
across the country are using FRT systems, like Clearview AI, to identify suspects and solve crime. 
See, e.g., id. 
 14. See CLARE GARVIE, ALVARO BEDOYA & JONATHAN FRANKLE, GEORGETOWN L. 
CTR. ON PRIV. & TECH., THE PERPETUAL LINE-UP: UNREGULATED POLICE FACE 
RECOGNITION IN AMERICA 46–47 (2016) [hereinafter THE PERPETUAL LINE-UP], https://
www.perpetuallineup.org [https://perma.cc/7BPC-PUBB] (“Compared to fingerprinting, state-
of-the-art face recognition is far less reliable . . . .”). This is especially true when applied to people 
of color. Kashmir Hill, Wrongfully Accused by an Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2020), https://
nyti.ms/3dAQA89 [https://perma.cc/N5X8-2ZXJ]. Issues related to the accuracy of FRT are 
beyond the scope of this Note.  
 15. See Chris Buckley & Paul Mozur, How China Uses High-Tech Surveillance To Subdue 
Minorities, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2HwEiRc [https://perma.cc/BMW6-55M3] 
(explaining the use of FRT to monitor and subdue minority populations in China).  
 16. E.g., United States v. Wright, 431 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1179 (D. Nev. 2020). These cases 
have typically involved the compelled unlocking of a smart phone using FRT. See, e.g., id. (holding 
law enforcement violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
“when they forcibly unlocked his smartphone . . . by holding it up to his face”). 
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have avoided directly addressing the Fourth Amendment search and 
seizure issues associated with FRT.17 Yet, as the technology becomes a 
staple in law enforcement investigations, it is only a matter of time 
before courts address these issues head on. In anticipation of these 
challenges, scholars have devoted significant attention to FRT.18 They 
largely focus on how the Fourth Amendment might regulate facial 
recognition in domestic law enforcement settings.19 Very few scholars,20 
however, have addressed how the Fourth Amendment applies to FRT 
used at international borders,21 where Fourth Amendment protections 
are often already diminished.22   
 
 17. E.g., id. at 1186 n.6 (“[T]he Court need not, and does not, reach Defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment argument as to the same issue.”); United States v. Jackson, 19-CR-6026CJS, 2020 
WL 810747, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2020) (declining to reach the question of whether the 
Fourth Amendment permits compelled unlocking of a phone using FRT on the grounds that the 
evidence would have been inevitably discovered).  
 18. A Westlaw search of law reviews and journals for articles using the terms “facial 
recognition,” “Fourth Amendment,” and “search” recovered 242 pieces. Term Search in 
Secondary Sources, WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2021) (in the 
search bar, type “‘facial recognition,’ and ‘Fourth Amendment’ and ‘search’” and limit the 
Publication Type to “Law Reviews and Journals”). 
 19. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional 
Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 505–39 (2012) 
(exploring the Fourth Amendment considerations of FRT); Sabrina A. Lochner, Note, Saving 
Face: Regulating Law Enforcement’s Use of Mobile Facial Recognition Technology & Iris Scans, 
55 ARIZ. L. REV. 201, 214–17 (2013) (arguing police use of FRT is not a search); Elizabeth Snyder, 
Note, “Faceprints” and the Fourth Amendment: How the FBI Uses Facial Recognition To Conduct 
Unlawful Searches, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 255, 260–70 (2018) (arguing the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s (“FBI’s”) use of FRT is a search). 
 20. To date, the only scholar to have addressed this particular issue with any depth has been 
Professor Andrew Ferguson. In the context of a larger piece on the Fourth Amendment 
implications of FRT, Professor Ferguson briefly notes that the use of face verification at the 
border is most likely constitutional. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Facial Recognition and the 
Fourth Amendment, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1105, 1205–07 (2021) (arguing that its use may be allowed 
given precise legislation). Similarly, Brandon Thompson, in a piece exploring the Fourth 
Amendment issues with DHS’s biometric data collection system, briefly suggests the Fourth 
Amendment may limit the use of FRT at the border and proposes a legislative solution. Brandon 
R. Thompson, Note, Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology (HART) Data Collection: 
Fourth Amendment Considerations & Suggested Statutory Alternatives, 29 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
155, 170–71 (2019). 
 21. For purposes of this Note, the “border” means the physical border with either Mexico or 
Canada. How FRT might be regulated in near-the-border contexts, like roving stops, see, e.g., 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884–85 (1975) (articulating circumstances under 
which U.S. Border Patrol officers may stop vehicles while on roving patrol), is beyond the scope 
of this Note.  
 22. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539 (1985) (noting that the 
“expectation of privacy [is] less at the border than in the interior”). For example, searches that 
would be clearly unconstitutional if conducted without a warrant in the “interior” would pass 
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This Note is the first to comprehensively address how the Fourth 
Amendment might regulate facial recognition at the border. It argues 
that after the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States,23 
the Fourth Amendment must offer some protection against the 
suspicionless use of FRT at the border. Drawing a distinction between 
two uses of FRT—face verification and face identification—this Note 
argues that the use of face identification at the border is a “search” 
implicating the Fourth Amendment only when the images displayed to 
an officer reveal “the privacies of life.”24 Because of the lack of caselaw 
applying the Fourth Amendment to FRT at the border,25 this Note 
applies the existing border-search doctrine and argues that this form of 
face identification is particularly invasive and constitutes a nonroutine 
border search. As a nonroutine search, face identification—unlike 
mere verification—is unconstitutional without individualized, 
reasonable suspicion.26 Further, reasonable suspicion must be tied to a 
crime that relates to the purposes underlying the border-search 
doctrine.27  
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I explains how FRT operates 
and how it is currently deployed at the border, and Part II outlines the 
Fourth Amendment doctrine defining “searches” after Carpenter. Part 
III then describes the border-search doctrine and the scope of Fourth 
 
Fourth Amendment muster at the border. Compare United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 
(2012) (holding the physical placement of a GPS tracker on a car is a search requiring a warrant), 
with United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155–56 (2004) (permitting the removal of a 
gas tank without a warrant or individualized suspicion). 
 23. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).  
 24. See id. at 2214 (“[T]he [Fourth] Amendment seeks to secure ‘the privacies of life’ against 
‘arbitrary power.’” (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886))).  
 25. A Westlaw search for cases using the terms “facial recognition,” “Fourth Amendment,” 
and “border” recovered only eight cases. Term Search in Secondary Sources, WESTLAW, https://
1.next.westlaw.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2021) (in the search bar, search for All Federal Cases, 
type “‘facial recognition,’ and ‘Fourth Amendment’ and ‘border’” and limit the results to those 
containing these precise terms). None of these cases explored whether the use of FRT at the 
border constitutes a search.  
 26. Individual suspicion is reasonable when there are “specific and articulable facts which, 
taken together with rational inferences from those facts,” justify a search. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 21 (1968). Probable cause is a higher standard. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–
76 (1949) (“Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within [the officers’] 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is 
being committed.” (alterations in original) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 
(1925))).  
 27. See infra Part III.A. 
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Amendment protections available at the border. Next, Part IV poses a 
hypothetical border-search situation involving the use of FRT to frame 
the discussion of when, if at all, the use of FRT at the border constitutes 
a search. Finally, Part V argues that in certain circumstances, the 
suspicionless use of facial recognition at the border is an unreasonable 
search absent an officer having individualized, reasonable suspicion to 
justify it.  
I.  FACIAL RECOGNITION AT THE BORDER 
The Fourth Amendment exists, in part, to “place obstacles in the 
way of a too permeating police surveillance.”28 Yet new technologies 
threaten to impose that very surveillance. To avoid leaving Fourth 
Amendment protections “at the mercy of advancing technology,”29 as 
the Supreme Court has cautioned against, any application of the 
Fourth Amendment to new surveillance tools must begin with an 
understanding of that technology’s capabilities. This Part describes 
how FRT operates. It then distinguishes between FRT’s use for face 
verification and identification, and it concludes by discussing the 
technology’s deployment at the border.  
A. Introduction to Facial Recognition Technology 
1. How the Technology Works.  At its core, facial recognition is an 
automated form of biometrics that identifies a person based on his or 
her unique facial features.30 The facial recognition process has three 
basic stages. First, during the collection and extraction stage, a 
computer algorithm scans an image to detect any human faces present 
in the frame.31 Scans can occur in real time using an FRT-equipped 
camera or after the fact by scanning video footage and photographs 
captured in the past.32 If the camera detects a face, the algorithm then 
 
 28. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)). 
 29. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001).  
 30. Facial Recognition, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (last updated Oct. 24, 2017) [hereinafter 
EFF, Facial Recognition], https://www.eff.org/pages/face-recognition [https://perma.cc/2GL6-
ZSXP]. Although each facial recognition system is different, FRT systems will typically plot 
virtual points on a person’s face and measure the distance between features such as a person’s 
eyes or the shape of a person’s chin. Id. 
 31. THE PERPETUAL LINE-UP, supra note 14, at 9.  
 32. See id. at 10–12, 22 (noting that police can perform face identification “in real-time,” 
when “[a] face recognition program extracts faces from live video feeds of one or more security 
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aligns the image, measures the distance between key facial features, 
and extracts those measurements to create a unique, numerical code 
known as a face template.33  
Second, during the comparison and matching stage, facial-
recognition software compares the extracted face template against 
other templates generated from known faces stored in a comparison 
database.34 These databases are built by both governmental and private 
entities and are populated with images from governmental and 
commercial sources.35 Third, after completing the comparison, the 
software returns a probabilistic “match” indicating who the software 
concludes is the person in the original image.36 Depending on how a 
user adjusts the software’s settings, the system will return the most 
likely matches—it will usually be just a few—or all matches that meet 
a predetermined confidence threshold.37 Because the user can 
customize the search, what the matching process looks like in practice 
depends on how law enforcement is using FRT.  
2. How the Technology Is Used.  FRT has a variety of uses.38 In 
general, these uses can be split into two groups: face verification and 
face identification.39 Beginning with the former, the use of face 
verification is widespread and varies from unlocking smart phones to 
confirming someone’s identity at the border.40 Its purpose is to 
“confirm[] that a particular human face . . . matches a preset digital 
 
cameras and continuously compares them,” or after a stop or an arrest, when a “mug shot may be 
searched against the existing entries” in a database).  
 33. EFF, Facial Recognition, supra note 30.  
 34. Id.  
 35. See Hill, supra note 13. Governmental sources may, for example, include images from 
driver’s license photos or criminal mugshot databases. See EFF, Facial Recognition, supra note 30 
(describing the images contained in the FBI’s image database). Private companies like Clearview 
AI may, on the other hand, collect images from social media sites through a process known as 
“scraping.” Hill, supra note 13. 
 36. See EFF, Facial Recognition, supra note 30 (“Some face recognition systems, instead of 
positively identifying an unknown person, are designed to calculate a probability match score 
between the unknown person and specific face templates stored in the database. These systems 
will offer up several potential matches, ranked in order of likelihood . . . .”).  
 37. For more information on the confidence thresholds used to generate matches, see infra 
notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
 38. Ferguson, supra note 20, at 1112–13. 
 39. See, e.g., THE PERPETUAL LINE-UP, supra note 14, at 10.  
 40. Ferguson, supra note 20, at 1113 & n.41.  
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image of that face.”41 Face verification can operate in a couple ways. 
For one, it can collect a person’s face template in real time and compare 
it to a single image of that person.42 It then produces a binary, yes-or-
no response (a “one-to-one match”) as to whether both images are the 
same person.43 Alternatively, a user can submit a photo to the face-
verification system to have it compared against a broader set of 
constrained pictures from sources like travel documents.44  
Second, FRT can go beyond mere verification to be used for face 
identification. Such systems identify an unknown person by collecting 
his or her picture and “querying an entire gallery of images in a 
database to find an image similar to a submitted image.”45 Rather than 
return a simple one-to-one match, face-identification systems display a 
“candidate list” comprising all the images a system believes resemble 
the submitted image.46 How many images the software returns depends 
on the confidence threshold set by the user.47 For example, if a user sets 
a similarity score of seventy-five, then the system will return all images 
that have a 75 percent or greater likelihood of matching the person in 
the submitted image. Setting the score to ninety-nine will, of course, 
return fewer images.48 Law enforcement officers typically use face-
 
 41. Id. at 1113.  
 42. For example, a CBP official may verify a traveler’s identity by comparing a single, real-time 
photo with the image on the travel document presented by the traveler. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., DHS/CBP/PIA-056, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE TRAVELER VERIFICATION 
SERVICE 2, 33 (2018) [hereinafter TVS PRIVACY IMPACT], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/privacy-pia-cbp056-tvs-january2020_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/CW7J-JE3Z] (describing 
how CBP compares “real-time photographs” against other face templates). 
 43. Ferguson, supra note 20, at 1114; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/ICE/PIA-054, 
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE ICE USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION SERVICES 3 (2020) 
[hereinafter ICE PRIVACY IMPACT], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-
pia-ice-frs-054-may2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5LA-GDWQ] (describing face verification as a 
one-to-one matching system). 
 44. See TVS PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 42, at 4 (describing how TVS face verification 
compares the submitted photo against “photographs captured by CBP during previous entry 
inspection, photographs from U.S. passports and U.S. visas, and photographs from other DHS 
encounters”). Constrained images are pictures that have minimized the variables impacting 
accuracy such as “poses, expressions, lighting, and distances.” ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 
43, at 3. Unconstrained images are pictures that have not eliminated variables impacting image 
quality. Id. An example of an unconstrained image is the prototypical social media profile picture, 
which may be taken at an angle or include other people.  
 45. ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 43, at 3. 
 46. Id. at 4–5. 
 47. Id. at 4. 
 48. See id. (noting that a lower similarity score results in a larger number of images). This 
system is also found in the commercial context. Amazon’s facial recognition system, known as 
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identification systems to identify suspects during criminal 
investigations.49 Although face verification and identification operate 
similarly during collection and extraction, each raises distinct 
constitutional concerns during the comparison and matching process, 
as Parts IV and V discuss. 
B. Facial Recognition at the Border 
The deployment of FRT at the nation’s borders comes primarily 
in two forms and largely maps onto the verification–identification 
distinction explained above. On one hand, CBP uses face verification 
to confirm the identities of people entering the United States through 
ports of entry. On the other hand, U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”) uses face identification during criminal 
investigations both at and away from the border.  
1. Face Verification at Ports of Entry.  The Department of 
Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) Biometric Entry/Exit Program, known 
as the Traveler Verification Service (“TVS”), is the predominant use 
of FRT at the border.50 First piloted in 2016, the TVS verifies the 
identities of travelers entering or exiting the United States.51 And 
ultimately, the DHS aims to deploy face verification at all ports of 
entry—including air, sea, and land—under the auspices of agencies like 
CBP and the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”).52  
The TVS collection and comparison process differs depending on 
the system’s operational environment. These differences ultimately 
impact the kinds of images available to a border official evaluating a 
traveler’s admissibility into the United States. For example, a person 
arriving by air will have her photograph taken at customs and 
compared against a “gallery of known identities, based on the 
 
Rekognition, allows users to set the confidence threshold themselves. See AMAZON WEB SERVS., 
AMAZON REKOGNITION: DEVELOPER GUIDE 130 (2020), https://docs.aws.amazon.com/
rekognition/latest/dg/rekognition-dg.pdf#face-feature-differences [https://perma.cc/9BAS-9GV4].  
 49. EFF, Facial Recognition, supra note 30. One well-known example is that of Clearview 
AI. Hill, supra note 13. 
 50. See TVS PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 42, at 4 (“CBP will use the TVS as its backend 
matching service for all biometric entry and exit operations that use facial recognition . . . .”).  
 51. Id. at 1–2.  
 52. See id. at 45 (“CBP has been working with the Transportation Security 
Administration . . . to test the TVS process for verifying traveler identities using the TVS camera 
technology and matching services at the TSA security screening checkpoint.” (footnote omitted)).  
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manifests for all incoming flights for that day.”53 If one is arriving by 
land in a personally owned vehicle, a photograph is taken of the driver 
as she approaches the border.54 That image is compared against a 
gallery of recent travelers and images from travel documents.55 
Pedestrians, on the other hand, have their photograph taken as they 
approach the border and present their travel document to the CBP 
officer.56 The officer then performs a one-to-one match to confirm the 
traveler’s photograph matches what is on the travel document.57  
If the TVS verifies the traveler’s identity, then the traveler may 
enter or exit the United States, and the image is either immediately 
deleted or temporarily retained by DHS.58 If the TVS fails to verify a 
traveler’s identity, the individual may be subject to further inspection.59 
Current DHS policy gives some travelers the ability to opt out of TVS 
and choose a traditional, in-person inspection.60  
2. Face Identification During Criminal Investigations at the Border.  
ICE currently uses face identification during criminal investigations 
conducted by its investigative arm, Homeland Security Investigations 
(“HSI”).61 Although it is authorized to operate away from the border,62 
HSI often conducts operations at the border in partnership with other 
agencies, like CBP.63 ICE uses a variety of facial recognition services 
 
 53. Id. at 30. 
 54. Id. at 34 (describing how CBP “uses cameras at vehicle inbound lanes in order to take 
the facial images of vehicle occupants ‘at speed’ (under 20 mph) and biometrically match the new 
images against a TVS gallery of recent travelers”).  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. at 33. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. at 8–9.  
 59. Id. at 35. 
 60. See id. at 19–20. Currently, only U.S. citizens may opt out of a TVS scan. See id. at 20. 
 61. See ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 43, at 2, 5–6 (“HSI uses [facial recognition 
services’] many query functionalities to generate candidate lists to identify an unknown person or 
to locate a known person who may be using an alias or assumed identity. These requests are made 
in furtherance of ongoing investigations on a case-by-case basis.” (footnote omitted)).  
 62. See Domestic Operations, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/
domestic-operations [https://perma.cc/B7AN-KKEH] (listing the cities where HSI operates 
domestically). 
 63. See, e.g., United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, 
No. 20-1043 (U.S. Jan. 29, 2021) (describing how HSI agents supported a CBP investigation at the 
San Ysidro Port of Entry). HSI’s authority to combat “cross-border criminal activity” empowers 
the agency to investigate crimes that are not necessarily restricted to the border. See Homeland 
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(“FRS”) from different vendors, like Clearview AI,64 to identify 
unknown people.65 The comparison databases underlying these FRSs 
pose significant privacy concerns because they give ICE agents access 
to a large number of images of people regardless of whether they have 
committed a crime or even crossed a border before.66 Additionally, 
these images may reveal deeply personal information.  
ICE’s image-collection process is broader in some respects than 
that used by TVS. Rather than capturing photos in real time, ICE 
agents collect images from previously taken photographs or videos.67 
Sources include surveillance camera footage, social media websites, 
and images from seized digital devices.68 Agents then submit these 
photos to an FRS for comparison against the particular FRS vendor’s 
database in hopes of identifying the person in question.69  
Which FRS vendor an ICE agent uses determines the number and 
kind of images the agent’s search will return. If an agent submits an 
image to a federal-government FRS, the submitted image could be 
compared against millions of images drawn from government 
documents, such as passports and visas, images collected during FBI 
investigations, and national security watchlists.70 ICE agents can also 
submit photos to FRSs operated by state and local law enforcement 
agencies to compare submitted photos against state DMV and criminal 
history records.71 Finally, an agent can submit an image to commercial 
 
Security Investigations, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/hsi [https://
perma.cc/M5FV-9SWG] (listing the crimes that HSI is authorized to investigate).  
 64. ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 43, at 17. In late 2020, Clearview AI signed a contract 
with ICE to provide “mission support” services to HSI’s ongoing criminal investigations. Kim 
Lyons, ICE Just Signed a Contract with Facial Recognition Company Clearview AI, VERGE (Aug. 
19, 2020, 3:19 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/8/14/21368930/clearview-ai-ice-contract-
privacy-immigration [https://perma.cc/4BAM-VLAU]. 
 65. ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 43, at 16–17. An ICE agent can use an FRS only when 
its use is “directly relevant to an investigation.” Id. at 6.  
 66. For example, since 2018, ICE officials have run nearly one hundred face-identification 
searches of the Maryland driver’s license database—which contains photos, addresses, and names of 
over seven million Maryland drivers—without state or court approval in an effort to identify 
undocumented immigrants. Drew Harwell & Erin Cox, ICE Has Run Facial-Recognition Searches 
on Millions of Maryland Drivers, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2020, 10:55 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/02/26/ice-has-run-facial-recognition-searches-millions-
maryland-drivers [https://perma.cc/CRP4-NY9T]. 
 67. ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 43, at 6.  
 68. Id.  
 69. See id. at 9 (describing HSI’s process for submitting photos to an FRS).  
 70. Id. at 13–16. 
 71. Id. at 12–13. 
JIMENEZ THROUGH FC (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2021  7:59 PM 
1848  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1837 
vendors—like Clearview AI—that “maintain their own repository of 
images collected from either their own processes or searches of open 
source systems.”72 These databases can contain countless 
unconstrained images pulled from an even wider range of sources like 
social media websites and CCTV camera footage.73  
If the image submission returns a match, the FRS displays to the 
investigating agent a candidate list of all potentially similar images.74 
Again, because the agent can adjust the similarity score in the search’s 
settings,75 the number of images that populate the candidate list may 
be left to the agent’s discretion.76 If an image is collected from an open-
source website, the FRS may display the source URL to the officer.77 
Taken together, an ICE agent can potentially access many images that 
both collectively and individually reveal private—possibly deeply 
personal—information unrelated to a criminal investigation.  
Given the privacy concerns associated with face identification, 
ICE has implemented several safeguards designed to minimize its 
intrusive effects. ICE agents may submit photos only to FRS vendors 
that have been preapproved by HSI or the agent’s supervisor, unless 
exigent circumstances warrant the service’s immediate use.78 Any 
approved FRS vendor that returns images containing multiple people 
must isolate and display only the matched individual’s face.79 
Additionally, photos submitted to the FRS must be directly relevant to 
an ongoing HSI investigation,80 but matches cannot be used to trigger 
law enforcement action on their own.81 These agency safeguards are a 
step in the right direction because they limit unchecked intrusion into 
 
 72. Id. at 16–17. 
 73. Id. at 16; Madhumita Murgia, Who’s Using Your Face? The Ugly Truth About Facial 
Recognition, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/cf19b956-60a2-11e9-b285-
3acd5d43599e [https://perma.cc/8LCP-KRFR]. 
 74. ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 43, at 9. 
 75. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.  
 76. Cf. ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 43, at 4–5 (describing how the confidence levels 
set by the agent will influence the number of images returned). 
 77. Id. at 17. 
 78. Id. at 6–7. ICE protocols, however, do not specify what constitutes an “exigent 
circumstance.”  
 79. Id. at 17.  
 80. Id. at 6.  
 81. See id. at 11 (“HSI agents are instructed that any vetted FRS candidate match must be 
further investigated by the HSI agent receiving the lead prior to ICE taking any enforcement 
action against an individual.”).  
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personal privacy. But agency protocols, which are subject to change 
both over time and based on leadership, are no substitute for 
constitutional protections.82 After all, “the Founders did not fight a 
revolution to gain the right to government agency protocols.”83 The 
Constitution must provide an independent limit on the conduct of 
government agents.84 And one source for those potential constitutional 
limits is the Fourth Amendment.  
II.  FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH DOCTRINE 
The Fourth Amendment protects people within the United 
States85 against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”86 But if a 
government action is not a search (or seizure), then “the Fourth 
Amendment provides no protection at all.”87 So, the threshold inquiry 
is: Does the use of FRT at the border constitute a search?88 If so, then 
as Part III details, a court must determine whether that search was 
reasonable.89 
 
 82. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 398 (2014) (rejecting the government’s assurances 
that it would develop internal protocols to address privacy concerns relating to cloud computing). 
 83. Id.  
 84. See id. at 398, 403 (holding that the Fourth Amendment required a warrant for a cell 
phone search, despite assurances from the government that agencies would “develop protocols to 
address” cloud computing issues).  
 85. The Court has typically applied the Fourth Amendment to searches of noncitizens at the 
border. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 533, 539 (1985) (“Having 
presented herself at the border for admission, . . . respondent was entitled to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure.”). However, after United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the 
application of the Fourth Amendment to aliens who are in the United States, but who have not 
“developed substantial connections” to the United States, is an open question. 494 U.S. 259, 271–
73 (1990); see also Karen Nelson Moore, Aliens and the Constitution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 801, 840–
42 (2013) (“Whether aliens located within U.S. territory must satisfy the substantial connections 
test, or whether something less is sufficient, remains unresolved.”).  
 86. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 87. BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 211 (2017); see 
also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (noting that “the application of the Fourth 
Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim” a search 
occurred).  
 88. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213–14 (2018) (noting that Fourth 
Amendment protection rests upon the existence of a “search” and focusing the analysis on 
whether the use of a new technology constitutes an unreasonable search).  
 89. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537 (“The Fourth Amendment commands that 
searches and seizures be reasonable. What is reasonable depends upon all of the 
circumstances . . . .”). 
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A search occurs, as the Court held in Katz v. United States,90 when 
the government intrudes into an arena where a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.91 That test has both subjective and objective 
components.92 Subjectively, a person must demonstrate an “actual 
expectation of privacy.”93 Objectively, that expectation must “be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”94 The “basic 
guideposts” of the Fourth Amendment—namely, shielding “the 
privacies of life [from] arbitrary power” and “plac[ing] obstacles in the 
way of a too permeating police surveillance”—enhance the scope of 
this right.95 Common sense suggests that this framework would 
encompass a wide range of law enforcement activity.96 But in practice, 
post-Katz caselaw has limited the scope of what constitutes a 
“search.”97 This Part begins by surveying the Fourth Amendment 
doctrines that, pre-Carpenter, restricted the scope of what constitutes 
a “search.” It then discusses the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Carpenter, how it has reshaped the “search” analysis, and how it 
impacts the constitutionality of FRT.  
A. Pre-Carpenter Limits on Reasonable Expectations of Privacy  
When there is no reasonable expectation of privacy, there is no 
Fourth Amendment “search.” Prior to Carpenter, the Court’s decisions 
established limiting principles constraining what could count as a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Two in particular—activities and 
spaces visible to others and the third-party doctrine—posed challenges 
for classifying the use of FRT as a “search” for the purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment.  
 
 90. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 91. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (reasoning that the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment is related to a place where one has a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 92. See id. (stating a search occurs when the government intrudes on a subjective expectation 
of privacy “that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”).  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id.  
 95. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018). 
 96. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 87, at 211 (“Common sense would seem to dictate that 
whenever the government comes snooping, that’s a search.”).  
 97. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, GOVERNANCE STUD. AT BROOKINGS, IS THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT RELEVANT IN A TECHNOLOGICAL AGE? 3–9 (2010), https://www.brookings.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2016/06/1208_4th_amendment_slobogin.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7C2-9Y2U] 
(summarizing the three doctrines that, post-Katz, have limited the scope of what constitutes a 
Fourth Amendment search). 
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First, activities and spaces visible to others are not entitled to 
Fourth Amendment protection given that they are “knowingly 
expose[d] to the public.”98 Due to this principle, the Fourth 
Amendment typically does not protect from the mere observation of a 
person’s physical characteristics, including one’s facial features.99 As a 
result, the Fourth Amendment offers fewer protections against law 
enforcement collection of biometrics by noninvasive means—like 
photography.100 Like photographing a person, FRT might not amount 
to a search. The system takes a photo in real time or uses one submitted 
by a law enforcement officer for verification or identification. Yet to 
the contrary, some argue that FRT actually goes one step further. They 
argue that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in identity 
while in public—that is, a privacy to remain relatively anonymous while 
in public spaces.101 Because revealing a person’s identity using FRT 
would violate that expectation, the argument goes, such use of FRT is 
arguably a search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.102  
Relatedly, the Supreme Court has held that law enforcement’s 
observation of one’s public movements is not a search. For instance, in 
United States v. Knotts,103 the Court held that the GPS tracking of a car 
was not a search because the vehicle’s location on public roads was 
conveyed to the public.104 Thus, to the extent FRT—like GPS—reveals 
one’s location because the background of an unconstrained photo 
betrays where the photo was taken, the Fourth Amendment would 
have historically offered little protection. But even pre-Carpenter, this 
 
 98. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
 99. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (“No person can have a reasonable 
expectation that others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably 
expect that his face will be a mystery to the world.”).  
 100. See, e.g., In re. Search of [Redacted] Washington, D.C., 317 F. Supp. 3d 523, 531 (D.D.C. 
2018) (collecting cases). Some commentators argue that facial recognition is simply another form 
of photography and, therefore, is not a search. See, e.g., Lochner, supra note 19, at 214–17 
(“[U]nder both the trespass test and Katz test, FRT is not likely to be a Fourth Amendment 
search.”).  
 101. See Mariko Hirose, Privacy in Public Spaces: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Against the Dragnet Use of Facial Recognition Technology, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1591, 1600–19 
(2017) (arguing FRT infringes on one’s reasonable expectation of privacy in identity while in 
public); see also Jeffrey M. Skopek, Reasonable Expectations of Anonymity, 101 VA. L. REV. 691, 
725–61 (2015) (arguing for the Fourth Amendment significance of anonymity). 
 102. Hirose, supra note 101, at 1600.  
 103. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 104. Id. at 281–82.  
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conclusion was not inevitable. Indeed, in United States v. Jones,105 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor reasoned in a concurring opinion that with 
sufficient locational data, police might learn enough about a person’s 
private life to make such surveillance a search.106 Further, she 
suggested that due to technological advances, the Court would need to 
look more closely at what privacy means in the digital age.107  
Second, under the third-party doctrine, information voluntarily 
conveyed to another is not entitled to an expectation of privacy.108 The 
Court has explained that an individual “takes the risk, in revealing his 
affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person 
to the [g]overnment.”109 In practice, this doctrine empowered the 
government to freely access records held by third parties—such as 
banks and phone companies—without implicating the Fourth 
Amendment.110 To the extent FRT relies on similar third-party 
information, the Fourth Amendment would have offered little 
protection. In short, pre-Carpenter caselaw limited the scope of what 
constituted a reasonable expectation of privacy so much that law 
enforcement use of FRT was arguably unregulated by the Fourth 
Amendment.  
B. Carpenter Searches  
Before 2018, the case for classifying the use of FRT as a search was 
difficult because of these limiting principles. However, the Court’s 
landmark decision in Carpenter fundamentally altered this analysis.111 
 
 105. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 106. See id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that GPS-monitoring can “generate[] 
a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail 
about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations” that should be 
relevant to the search analysis). 
 107. See id. at 417–18 (arguing that the third-party doctrine may be “ill suited to the digital 
age” where people disclose a “great deal” of personal information during even “mundane tasks”). 
 108. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744–45 (1979) (permitting the warrantless use of a 
pen register to record calling history); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443–45 (1976) 
(permitting the warrantless collection of bank records). 
 109. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
 110. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 97, at 7–9 (detailing how the third-party doctrine permits the 
governmental collection of private, digital information “free and clear of Fourth Amendment 
constraints”).  
 111. See, e.g., ORIN S. KERR, Implementing Carpenter, in THE DIGITAL FOURTH 
AMENDMENT (forthcoming in Oxford University Press) (manuscript at 1) [hereinafter KERR, 
Implementing Carpenter], https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3301257 [https://perma.cc/VG2S-
PK7N] (discussing Carpenter as “embark[ing] on a new path” of Fourth Amendment 
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There, the Court examined whether government collection of CSLI 
held by a third party could, in some circumstances, constitute a 
search.112  
Timothy Carpenter was suspected of being involved in a string of 
cell-phone-store robberies over a four-month period.113 During the 
course of the investigation, the government sought a court order—
based on less than probable cause—to compel the disclosure of more 
than five months of Carpenter’s aggregated CSLI data.114 After 
receiving 127 days of CSLI data, the government noticed, and 
ultimately argued at trial, “that Carpenter was right where 
the . . . robbery was at the exact time of the robbery.”115 He was 
convicted and sentenced to over one hundred years in prison.116 On 
appeal, Carpenter argued that the government’s warrantless collection 
of his CSLI violated the Fourth Amendment.117  
The Court agreed that collecting aggregate data on Carpenter’s 
location was a Fourth Amendment search.118 Although Carpenter’s 
holding was narrow,119 the decision’s rationale marked an evolution in 
Fourth Amendment doctrine that—as courts are beginning to 
recognize—carries significant implications for the constitutionality of 
modern surveillance techniques.120 A close reading of Carpenter 
 
jurisprudence); Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Fourth Amendment Reasonableness After Carpenter, 128 
YALE L.J. F. 943, 943 (2019) (discussing how Carpenter limits the third-party doctrine); Paul Ohm, 
The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 357, 358 (2019) (noting “Carpenter 
work[ed] a series of revolutions in Fourth Amendment law”); Susan Freiwald & Stephen Wm. 
Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near-Perfect Surveillance, 132 HARV. L. REV. 205, 206 (2018) 
(discussing Carpenter’s effect on the third-party doctrine). 
 112. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018). 
 113. Id. at 2212. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 2212–13 (quoting Joint Appendix at 131, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
2206 (2018) (No. 16-402), 2017 WL 3614549, at *131). 
 116. Id. at 2213. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 2219.  
 119. Id. at 2220.  
 120. For examples of the modern technologies being evaluated under the Carpenter 
framework, see generally United States v. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d 307, 311–13 (5th Cir. 2020) 
(considering Carpenter’s application to a collection of Bitcoin transactions but ultimately rejecting 
it); Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 456 F. Supp. 3d 699, 715–17 (D. Md.), 
aff’d, 979 F.3d 219, reh’g en banc granted, 831 Fed. App’x. 662 (4th Cir. 2020) (considering 
Carpenter’s application to advanced aerial surveillance); United States v. Carme, No. 19-10073-
RGS, 2020 WL 3270877, at *4–5 (D. Mass. June 17, 2020) (considering Carpenter’s application to 
forensic deciphering of BitTorrent software but ultimately rejecting it); Commonwealth v. 
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highlights several key factors relevant to the Fourth Amendment 
analysis of governmental surveillance tools that access third-party 
records.121 In particular, those factors include the sophistication of the 
technology in question and the absence of any meaningful disclosure 
to the third party collecting the data. 
First, the impact of modern technology was central to Carpenter’s 
rationale and holding.122 The CSLI data collected by the government 
was only available because of “seismic shifts in digital technology.”123 
This technology, in turn, gave the government seamless—and nearly 
instantaneous—access to “an entirely different species” of information 
about individuals.124 Before the digital age, the cost and logistical 
challenges associated with continuous physical surveillance made 
obtaining similar locational information nearly impossible.125 But now, 
locational information like CSLI is captured continuously, is accurate, 
and does not require physical surveillance.126 Importantly, because 
CSLI tracks a person’s cell phone—which is frequently on one’s 
person—CSLI gives law enforcement an even more comprehensive 
profile of a person’s movements than tracking a vehicle would.127 Given 
the novel concerns this raised, the Court could not easily extend prior 
precedents.128 Thus, the use of digital surveillance technology that gives 
the government seamless access to a qualitatively and quantitatively 
different kind of record implicates Carpenter.129 
 
McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d 1090, 1099–107 (Mass. 2020) (considering Carpenter in its analysis of 
automated license plate readers); State v. Muhammad, 451 P.3d 1060, 1071–74 (Wash. 2019) 
(applying Carpenter to real-time CSLI). 
 121. See KERR, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 111 (manuscript at 16–27) (discussing 
three components of a Carpenter search).  
 122. Id. at 16.  
 123. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219. 
 124. Id. at 2222. 
 125. Id. at 2217. 
 126. See id. at 2217–19.  
 127. See id. at 2218–19 (“Only the few without cell phones could escape this tireless and 
absolute surveillance.”).  
 128. See id. at 2222 (“When confronting new concerns wrought by digital technology, this 
Court has been careful not to uncritically extend existing precedents.”).  
 129. See id. (noting that CSLI does not resemble traditional business records); supra note 120 
(listing cases that adopt or distinguish the Carpenter analysis based on whether the technology 
was sufficiently modern or traditional); see also KERR, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 111 
(manuscript at 16–19) (discussing Carpenter as limited to digital-age technology).  
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Second, the absence of any meaningful disclosure was another 
significant factor driving Carpenter’s holding.130 The CSLI produced by 
Carpenter’s phone was generated continuously, automatically, and 
without his knowledge.131 Because there was no “affirmative act on the 
part of [Carpenter] beyond powering up” his phone, Carpenter did not 
voluntarily disclose his locational information in any “meaningful 
sense” that justified applying the third-party doctrine.132 The Court also 
rejected the government’s argument that Carpenter’s decision to use a 
cell phone was equivalent to a voluntary disclosure of his CSLI data 
because, as the Court noted in its earlier decision in Riley v. 
California,133 cell phones are “indispensable to participation in modern 
society.”134 Deciding to use a cell phone may have technically been a 
voluntary disclosure, but the lack of any meaningful choice meant that 
Carpenter was effectively compelled to disclose the CSLI.135 Because 
the third-party doctrine does not apply to records created without a 
meaningfully voluntary choice,136 the collection of those records by the 
government is likely a search.  
Based on these factors, Carpenter’s central innovation was 
extending a reasonable expectation of privacy to third-party digital 
records that reveal the “privacies of life.”137 Writing for the majority, 
Chief Justice John Roberts noted that the government’s collection of 
127 days’ worth of historical CSLI meant that Carpenter’s movements 
had effectively been surveilled every moment of his life.138 The Court 
cited concerns first expressed in Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in 
United States v. Jones and concluded that the aggregation of a person’s 
 
 130. KERR, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 111 (manuscript at 20). 
 131. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (“Virtually any activity on the phone generates CSLI.”).  
 132. Id. (emphasis added) (reasoning that Carpenter did not “voluntarily ‘assume[] the risk’ 
of turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical movements” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979))).  
 133. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
 134. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (citing Riley, 573 U.S. at 385). 
 135. See id. (“Apart from disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid 
leaving behind a trail of location data.”); see also KERR, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 111 
(manuscript at 21) (“Carpenter has a compulsion requirement.”).  
 136. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.  
 137. KERR, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 111 (manuscript at 21–22).  
 138. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218–19 (“Whoever the suspect turns out to be, he has 
effectively been tailed every moment of every day for five years . . . .”). 
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movements via CSLI is “deeply revealing.”139 Following Justice 
Sotomayor’s earlier argument regarding GPS tracking, the Court 
concluded CSLI could also demonstrate one’s “familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations.”140 Information that 
intimate, post-Carpenter, cannot be collected by the government 
without constitutional restrictions.  
Thus, digital records that are similarly revealing when aggregated 
may be entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy.141 As a result, 
when police obtain those records in pursuit of a suspect, it constitutes 
a search under the Fourth Amendment. FRT and CSLI share 
similarities that, as Part IV discusses, likely implicate Carpenter’s 
analysis.142 But as the Court acknowledged, this rule would not carry 
across all contexts.143 The next Part explores Carpenter’s application to 
a new technology in a unique context: the border.  
III.  FOURTH AMENDMENT REASONABLENESS AT THE BORDER 
Even if a search has occurred, “the ultimate touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”144 The baseline measure of 
reasonableness is the existence of a warrant, signed by a neutral 
magistrate, and supported by probable cause.145 As a general rule, 
warrantless searches are “per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”146 The 
“border-search exception” is one such case.147 However, exceptions to 
the warrant requirement are subject to two key limitations: scope and 
intrusiveness.148  
 
 139. Id. at 2217, 2223 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring)).  
 140. Id. at 2217–18 (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).  
 141. KERR, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 111 (manuscript at 22). 
 142. See infra Part IV.  
 143. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222–23. The Court recognized that the warrantless collection of 
CSLI might be reasonable if there are exigent circumstances that make obtaining a warrant 
unreasonable. Id. Furthermore, the Court declined to consider “collection techniques involving 
foreign affairs or national security.” Id. at 2220.  
 144. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 
398, 403 (2006)).  
 145. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
 146. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
 147. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 620 (1977).  
 148. United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1011–12 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, No. 
20-1043 (U.S. Jan. 29, 2021).  
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Given that exceptions to the warrant requirement are justified 
only for limited purposes, those purposes control the scope of the 
search.149 Searches that do not further the purposes underlying an 
exception are outside the exception’s scope and require a warrant—or 
a different exception—to be justified.150 Additionally, the manner in 
which a search is conducted remains relevant to its constitutionality, 
even if that search is within the scope of an enumerated exception.151 
At a certain point, a search may be conducted in a manner so intrusive 
that it becomes unreasonable without added Fourth Amendment 
protections.152 Courts evaluate the reasonableness of a search “by 
‘balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment 
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.’”153  
To understand how the Fourth Amendment should regulate FRT 
at the border, this Part outlines the structure of the border-search 
exception and the underlying purposes that control its scope. It then 
describes the distinction between routine searches, which require no 
individual suspicion, and nonroutine searches, which are unreasonable 
without individualized suspicion. This Part concludes with a discussion 
of the debate over whether electronic-device searches are routine or 
nonroutine as a helpful frame for later applying the doctrine to FRT.  
 
 149. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 385–86 (declining to extend the search-incident-to-arrest exception 
to cell phones that posed no risk to officer safety or of evidence destruction); Arizona v. Gant, 
556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009) (noting that officer safety and evidence preservation needs to “define 
the boundaries of the [search-incident-to-arrest] exception”); see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 
385, 393–95 (1978) (holding unlawful a warrantless search based on the exigent circumstances 
exception when there was no exigency).  
 150. Gant, 556 U.S. at 351 (stating that when the justifications underlying one exception are 
absent, a search will be “unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another 
exception to the warrant requirement applies”).  
 151. See Cano, 934 F.3d at 1012 (“[W]hile routine searches may be conducted at the border 
without any showing of suspicion, a more intrusive, nonroutine search must be supported by 
‘reasonable suspicion.’” (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537–41 
(1985))). 
 152. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 533–35, 541 (suggesting a 16-hour border 
detention “beyond the scope” of a routine search would be unconstitutional without reasonable 
suspicion); Cano, 934 F.3d at 1011 (“[S]ome searches, even when conducted within the scope of 
the exception, are so intrusive that they require additional justification, up to and including 
probable cause and a warrant.”). Notably, these protections extend equally to citizens and 
noncitizens at the border.  
 153. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537–41 (quoting United States v. Villamonte-
Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983)).  
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A. The Border-Search Doctrine 
Under the border-search exception, border officials154 may 
conduct warrantless, and often suspicionless, searches at the border.155 
The legal authority to conduct warrantless searches is “as old as the 
Fourth Amendment itself”156 and based on the United States’ 
“inherent authority to protect, and a paramount interest in protecting, 
its territorial integrity.”157 To that end, the Supreme Court has 
identified several justifications that animate the border-search 
doctrine. Warrantless border searches are permissible to the extent 
they are needed to protect national security, collect duties, intercept 
contraband, and enforce immigration laws.158 Although the precise 
scope of the exception remains an open question,159 a border search 
that is too attenuated from this rationale falls outside the scope of the 
exception.160  
Even within the scope of the exception, border searches must still 
be reasonable.161 At the border, the reasonableness balance is 
“qualitatively different” and weighs “much more favorably to the 
Government.”162 The government’s paramount interest in border 
security is weighed against the individual’s diminished—but not 
 
 154. Border searches may only be conducted by “customs and immigration officials, but not 
general law enforcement such as FBI agents.” Cano, 934 F.3d at 1013; see also 19 C.F.R. § 162.6 
(2020) (stating all people and objects entering the country are “liable to inspection and search by 
a Customs officer”). 
 155. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152–53 (2004).  
 156. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977).  
 157. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 153.  
 158. See id. at 152–53 (acknowledging the border-search doctrine rests on the sovereign’s right 
to protect itself, regulate the collection of duties, prevent the introduction of contraband, and 
prevent the entry of unwanted persons into the United States). For a comprehensive review of 
the United States’ customs and immigration laws, see Laura K. Donohue, Customs, Immigration, 
and Rights: Constitutional Limits on Electronic Border Searches, 128 YALE L.J. F. 961, 972–93 
(2019) [hereinafter Donohue, Customs, Immigration, and Rights]. 
 159. Compare Cano, 934 F.3d at 1016–19 (holding the border-search exception only sanctions 
searches for contraband presently at the border, not “evidence of past or future border-related 
crimes”), with United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 143–44 (4th Cir. 2018) (stating the border-
search exception encompasses both the direct interception of contraband and evidence of 
“ongoing transnational crime”), and United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713, 720–21 (4th Cir. 
2019) (holding the border-search exception does not encompass searches solely for evidence of 
domestic crimes). 
 160. See, e.g., Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d at 721 (holding an electronic-device search, based solely 
on knowledge of domestic crimes, would go beyond the scope of the exception).  
 161. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985). 
 162. Id. at 538–40.  
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absent—expectation of privacy.163 In practice, several factors affect the 
reasonableness of a border search, including where the search takes 
place and how it is conducted.  
1. Where a Search Is Conducted.  Searches at the physical border 
or its “functional equivalent”—such as an international airport—are 
almost always per se reasonable and do not require any individualized 
suspicion.164 Meanwhile, searches physically removed from the border 
often require some level of individualized suspicion.165  
2. How a Search Is Conducted: Routine and Nonroutine Border 
Searches.  Recognizing that some border searches are conducted in a 
more intrusive manner than others, courts distinguish between routine 
and nonroutine searches. As the term connotes, most common border 
searches are considered routine under existing law. This includes 
identification checks, vehicle and luggage inspections, canine sniffs, 
and removal of the outer garments.166 The Court has treated routine 
searches as essential to furthering the government’s mission to 
determine a person’s admissibility, collect customs duties, and 
intercept contraband.167 More importantly, the privacy intrusion 
caused by these searches—at least in the context of the government’s 
 
 163. See id. at 539 (noting a traveler’s expectation of privacy is only “less at the border than 
in the interior” (emphasis added)). 
 164. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152–53 (2004) (“Time and time again, 
we have stated that ‘searches made at the border . . . are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact 
that they occur at the border.’” (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977))); see 
also id. at 150 (holding that a search at the Otay Mesa Port of Entry did not require reasonable 
suspicion). The exception applies equally at the Canadian border and any interior airport where 
an international flight can land. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE 
ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.5(a) nn.14 & 16 (6th ed. 2020) (collecting cases applying the 
exception at the Canadian border and international airports). 
 165. Known as “extended border searches,” the Court has, in some contexts, been willing to 
require probable cause for these searches. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 
881–82 (1975) (holding Border Patrol officers may, on a “roving-patrol,” stop a vehicle near the 
border to inquire about “citizenship and immigration status . . . but any further detention or 
search must be based on consent or probable cause”). For further background on the contours of 
“extended border searches,” see generally LAFAVE, supra note 164, §§ 10.5(g), (h), (i), (j). 
 166. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 164, § 10.5(a) (describing routine searches at the 
border and existing caselaw). 
 167. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154–55 (highlighting drug-seizure statistics prior to 
holding that the removal of a gas tank is a routine search that does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment); United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713, 720 (4th Cir. 2019) (noting that routine, 
suspicionless searches at the border are permissible because of the government’s interests at the 
border).  
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security needs—is relatively minimal.168 Routine searches “are 
reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border” 
and require no individualized suspicion.169  
This presumption of reasonableness can be rebutted, however, by 
demonstrating that a particular search is so intrusive as to render it 
nonroutine. Nonroutine searches go “beyond the scope of a routine 
customs search”170 and are unreasonable unless supported by 
individualized suspicion.171 Though there is no established test for 
distinguishing between routine and nonroutine searches,172 courts have 
found nonroutine searches in different factual contexts. Some courts 
have found highly intrusive searches of a person’s body to be 
nonroutine,173 because unlike a routine search, these “cause any person 
significant embarrassment.”174 As a result, an officer must have 
reasonable suspicion before she can conduct them.175 Courts typically 
place body-cavity searches, for example, in this category, thus making 
them nonroutine.176  
The Supreme Court has also suggested that in some instances, 
physically destructive searches of personal property can be nonroutine 
 
 168. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154 (“[O]n many occasions, we have noted that the 
expectation of privacy is less at the border than it is in the interior. We have long recognized that 
automobiles seeking entry into this country may be searched.” (citation omitted)).  
 169. Id. at 152–53 (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977)). 
 170. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985). 
 171. See id. (holding an extended detention of a traveler to be reasonable if agents 
“reasonably suspect that the traveler is smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal”). 
 172. See YULE KIM, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31826, PROTECTING THE U.S. PERIMETER: 
“BORDER SEARCHES” UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 10–14 (2009) (noting there is “no 
established test that determines whether a particular search procedure is routine” and describing 
different types of routine and nonroutine search criteria). 
 173. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 302 F.3d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Non-routine searches 
include body cavity searches, strip searches, and x-rays . . . . These types of objectively intrusive 
searches would likely cause any person significant embarrassment and invade ‘the privacy and 
dignity of the individual.’” (quoting United States v. Sandler, 644 F.2d 1163, 1167 (5th Cir. 1981))).  
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. (“‘Non-routine’ border searches . . . are more intrusive and require a particularized 
reasonable suspicion before a search can be conducted.”).  
 176. See, e.g., Bustillos v. El Paso Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 891 F.3d 214, 220 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Cavity 
searches, strip searches, and x-ray examinations are all ‘non-routine.’” (citation omitted)). For 
example, the forced inspection of a suspect’s rectum in search of narcotics is nonroutine. See id. 
For more examples of nonroutine body searches, see generally LAFAVE, supra note 164, § 10.5(e). 
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and require reasonable suspicion.177 These cases, although rare, 
typically involve the permanent, physical destruction of property—
such as drilling into a car.178 Additionally, some courts have held that 
border searches significantly intruding on personal privacy, even 
though they do not involve the physical search of the body or 
destruction of personal property, are nonroutine.179 This issue has most 
commonly arisen in the context of searches of electronic devices, as the 
next Section details.  
B. Border Searches of Electronic Devices 
Border officials have been searching electronic devices, such as 
cell phones and laptops, as long as they have been in common use.180 
Beginning with Riley v. California in 2014, however, the Supreme 
Court has recognized the unique privacy interests associated with these 
devices.181 Following this decision, lower courts split on whether 
searches of electronic devices at the border can continue to be treated 
as routine.182 
In Riley, the Court rejected the warrantless search of an arrestee’s 
cell phone pursuant to the search-incident-to-arrest exception.183 
Under that exception, officers searching an arrestee’s person, and any 
containers within reaching distance, do not need a warrant if the search 
is conducted to ensure the officers’ safety or prevent the destruction of 
evidence.184 The Riley Court, however, refused to extend this exception 
to cell phones.185 It reasoned that such searches exceed the scope of the 
 
 177. Cf. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154 n.2 (2004) (noting “the obvious 
factual difference[s]” between removing and reassembling a fuel tank and “potentially destructive 
drilling” into a vehicle). 
 178. See id. (collecting drilling cases).  
 179. See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 720 F.2d 1378, 1381–82 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating 
reasonable suspicion justifies an abdominal x-ray scan).  
 180. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/CBP/PIA-008(A) PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
UPDATE FOR CBP BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES 1–2 (2018), https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/PIA-CBP%20-%20Border-Searches-of-Electronic-
Devices%20-January-2018%20-%20Compliant.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MKN-NYJJ] (noting CBP 
first issued a policy regarding electronic-device searches in 2009). 
 181. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393–97 (2014) (describing how “[c]ell phones differ 
in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an 
arrestee’s person”). 
 182. See infra notes 196–212 and accompanying text. 
 183. Riley, 573 U.S. at 401–03. 
 184. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009). 
 185. Riley, 573 U.S. at 384–86. 
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exception given that, in the vast majority of situations, an arrestee’s cell 
phone poses no risk to officers and cannot be used to destroy 
evidence.186 Furthermore, cell phone searches present special privacy 
concerns—unlike traditional containers such as boxes or car trunks—
given the sheer amount of deeply personal information contained in 
cell phones.187 Because the warrantless search of an arrestee’s cell 
phone would “untether the rule from the justifications underlying 
the . . . exception,”188 the Court held that officers searching a cell phone 
must first obtain a warrant.189 Riley’s logic quickly raised questions 
about the status of electronic-device searches at the border.190  
Unlike the Riley Court,191 lower courts calibrate the level of 
suspicion required for an electronic-device search at the border to the 
specific kind of search that was conducted. Although there are no 
established categories, courts tend to distinguish between brief, manual 
inspections and more thorough, “forensic” searches of electronic 
devices.192 Manual inspections are generally treated as routine searches 
that do not require individualized suspicion.193 Forensic searches, on 
the other hand, involve the use of specialized software to “gain 
 
 186. Id. at 386–91. 
 187. See id. at 393 (noting how “[m]odern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy 
concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse,” 
especially because of cell phones’ “immense storage capacity”). 
 188. Id. at 386 (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343).  
 189. See id. at 403 (“Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a 
cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”).  
 190. In the aftermath of Riley, some scholars argue that electronic-device searches must be 
considered nonroutine. See, e.g., Eunice Park, The Elephant in the Room: What Is a “Nonroutine” 
Border Search, Anyway? Digital Device Searches Post-Riley, 44 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 277, 298–
303 (2017); Thomas Mann Miller, Comment, Digital Border Searches After Riley v. California, 90 
WASH. L. REV. 1943, 1987–96 (2015). 
 191. The cell phone in Riley was inspected hours after the initial arrest back at the police 
station. Riley, 573 U.S. at 379. However, the Court fashioned a categorical rule for all cell phone 
searches rather than distinguishing between where or how a search was conducted. See id. at 398, 
403 (establishing a categorical rule on how cell-phone searches are conducted and emphasizing 
the need for the rule to be categorical to provide law enforcement with clear standards).  
 192. See, e.g., United States v. Kolsuz, 185 F. Supp. 3d 843, 858 (E.D. Va. 2016) (holding that 
the manual search of defendant’s iPhone at the airport was a routine border search, but the 
subsequent forensic search of the defendant’s iPhone conducted at the HSI office in Sterling, 
Virginia was a “nonroutine border search requiring some level of individualized suspicion”). 
 193. See, e.g., Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2021) (distinguishing between 
basic and advanced searches, and holding the former requires no individual suspicion); Park, 
supra note 190, at 288–92 (outlining how courts have “attempted to distinguish between routine 
and nonroutine [electronic-device] searches” by construing manual inspections as routine 
searches and forensic searches as nonroutine searches).  
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access . . . review, copy, and/or analyze [a device’s] contents.”194 These 
searches may be considered nonroutine and thus may require some 
level of individualized suspicion to be constitutional.195 
Since Riley, a circuit split has emerged regarding the appropriate 
level of Fourth Amendment protection applicable to searches of 
electronic devices.196 Some courts take the position that all searches of 
electronic devices are routine and do not require any level of 
individualized suspicion.197 In United States v. Touset,198 for example, 
the Eleventh Circuit expressly rejected the argument that the privacy 
interests associated with digital technology changed the border-search 
analysis: 
[I]t does not make sense to say that electronic devices should receive 
special treatment because so many people now own them or because 
they can store vast quantities of records or effects. The same could be 
said for a recreational vehicle filled with personal effects or a tractor-
trailer loaded with boxes of documents. Border agents bear the same 
responsibility for preventing the importation of contraband in a 
traveler’s possession regardless of advances in technology.199  
Additionally, in the eyes of the Touset court, Riley’s reasoning 
simply did not apply because only intrusive searches of a person’s body 
 
 194. Donohue, Customs, Immigration, and Rights, supra note 158, at 970 (quoting U.S. 
CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CPD DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, BORDER SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC 
DEVICES 5 para. 5.1.4 (2018), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2018-Jan/
CBP-Directive-3340-049A-Border-Search-of-Electronic-Media-Compliant.pdf [https://perma.cc/
H8SU-UKRS]). 
 195. See, e.g., Kolsuz, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 858 (holding that the forensic search of the 
defendant’s iPhone was a nonroutine border search requiring “some level of individualized 
suspicion”).  
 196. Compare United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1015–18 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. 
filed, No. 20-1043 (U.S. Jan. 29, 2021) (reasonable suspicion required), and United States v. 
Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 146–48 (4th Cir. 2018) (individualized suspicion required but declining to 
decide the standard), with United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2018) (no 
reasonable suspicion required). 
 197. See, e.g., Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233 (“We see no reason why the Fourth Amendment would 
require suspicion for a forensic search of an electronic device when it imposes no such 
requirement for a search of other personal property.”); United States v. Feiten, No. 15-20631, 
2016 WL 894452, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 9, 2016) (“Allowing customs officials without a warrant 
to forensically search an electronic device presented at an international border or its equivalent 
is utterly consistent with its historical mooring of protecting the country by preventing unwanted 
goods from crossing the border into the country.”). 
 198. United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 199. Id. at 1233.  
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could be considered nonroutine.200 Other courts have simply avoided 
the constitutional question altogether by relying on the fact that 
reasonable suspicion existed at the time of the search or by applying 
the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.201  
On the other side of the split, several courts have held that forensic 
searches of electronic devices, which typically involve the use of 
specialized software, are too intrusive to be routine.202 On this line of 
reasoning, such searches are unconstitutional unless predicated on 
individualized suspicion.203 In reaching that conclusion, lower courts 
have raised important questions about the scope of the border 
exception in the digital age.  
In United States v. Cano,204 the Ninth Circuit construed the border-
search exception to only permit searches aimed at intercepting 
contraband present at the border, rather than “evidence of past or 
future border-related crimes.”205 Thus, forensic searches of electronic 
devices are constitutional only if the officer reasonably suspects it 
presently contains digital contraband.206 The Fourth Circuit has also 
found electronic-device searches nonroutine, but arrived at that 
conclusion via a different route. In United States v. Aigbekaen,207 it held 
that “the Government must have individualized suspicion of an offense 
that bears some nexus to the border search exception’s purposes of 
protecting national security, collecting duties, blocking the entry of 
 
 200. Id. at 1234. 
 201. See, e.g., United States v. Wanjiku, 919 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 2019) (finding both that 
reasonable suspicion existed and that the agents acted in good faith when they searched the 
devices); United States v. Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d 287, 290 (5th Cir. 2018) (applying the good-
faith exception); United States v. Ramirez, EP-18-CR-3530-PRM, 2019 WL 3502913, at *14–15 
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2019) (applying both). 
 202. See, e.g., United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. 
filed, No. 20-1043 (U.S. Jan. 29, 2021) (“Accordingly, we hold that manual searches of cell phones 
at the border are reasonable without individualized suspicion, whereas the forensic examination 
of a cell phone requires a showing of reasonable suspicion.”); United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 
133, 145–56 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[I]t is clear that a forensic search of a digital phone must be treated 
as a nonroutine border search, requiring some form of individualized suspicion.”). 
 203. Cano, 934 F.3d at 1015–18; Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 146–48. 
 204. United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 205. Id. at 1018. 
 206. Id. at 1019–20 (concluding that “border officials may conduct a forensic cell phone search 
only when they reasonably suspect that the cell phone to be searched itself contains contraband”). 
 207. United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713 (4th Cir. 2019). 
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unwanted persons, or disrupting efforts to export or import 
contraband.”208 
The government’s general interest in enforcing domestic criminal 
law is, according to the Fourth Circuit, unrelated to the sovereign’s 
interest in controlling who and what enters the country.209 Thus, a 
forensic search of an electronic device exceeds the scope of the border-
search exception when it is based entirely on knowledge of domestic 
crimes, rather than cross-border crimes.210 Similarly, in Alasaad v. 
Mayorkas,211 the First Circuit took a broad view of the scope of the 
border exception. The Alasaad court held that the border-search 
exception encompasses “search[es] for contraband, evidence of 
contraband, or for evidence of activity in violation of the laws enforced 
or administered by CBP or ICE.”212  
Further, the courts that say electronic-device searches are 
nonroutine have recognized that after Riley and Carpenter, the privacy 
interests implicated by digital devices are simply too significant to 
jeopardize by withholding Fourth Amendment protection.213 Courts 
that have decided what level of suspicion is necessary for these searches 
have settled on reasonable suspicion given its “modest, workable,” and 
familiar nature.214 Given that the Fourth Amendment question 
associated with FRT’s use at the border has not yet been squarely 
presented to a court, there is no caselaw on how border-search law 
might apply.215 The privacy issues associated with electronic-device 
searches, however, offer a useful framework for evaluating a future 
 
 208. Id. at 721 (emphasis added). 
 209. See id. (noting the border-search exception to the warrant requirement cannot be 
invoked based on a generalized interest in law enforcement). 
 210. Id. In Aigbekaen, the CBP officers searched the defendant’s computer because they 
suspected it contained evidence of his involvement in purely domestic sex trafficking. Id. at 717–
18. The Fourth Circuit held this search “lacked sufficient . . . nexus to the sovereign interests 
underlying the border search exception.” Id. at 724.  
 211. Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2021). 
 212. See id. at 20–21 (noting that “the border search exception’s purpose is not limited to 
interdicting contraband; it serves to bar entry to those ‘who may bring anything harmful into this 
country’” (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 544 (1985))). 
 213. See, e.g., United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1014–16 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. 
filed, No. 20-1043 (U.S. Jan. 29, 2021) (noting that the volume and sensitive nature of personal 
information stored on an electronic device requires a showing of reasonable suspicion before a 
forensic search); United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 144–47 (4th Cir. 2018) (same). 
 214. Cano, 934 F.3d at 1015 (quoting United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 966 (9th Cir. 
2013)).  
 215. See supra note 25. 
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case involving FRT’s use at the border. To understand how those 
limitations might take shape, consider the following hypothetical 
border search.  
IV.  WHEN IS THE USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION AT THE BORDER A 
SEARCH? 
Imagine you are a Border Patrol officer stationed at one of the 
many secondary inspection stations at the Laredo Juarez-Lincoln Port 
of Entry. It is early January, so northbound traffic into Texas is an 
absolute nightmare.216 The agent in the booth notifies you that another 
car is coming to your station. A surveillance camera captured an image 
of the driver as he approached the border in his car, but the TVS failed 
to return a positive match. Therefore, he was automatically directed to 
secondary inspection. You turn on your chest-mounted body camera 
to record the interaction. You meet with the driver and check his 
identification. He is a Nuevo Laredo resident studying in Laredo on a 
student visa. When you ask why he is crossing on a Saturday, he 
informs you that he is going to visit some friends before the semester 
starts on Monday. He mentions that he crosses on an almost daily basis 
for class.217 Another agent walks a drug-sniffing dog around the car, but 
the dog does not alert. You have a hunch something is not right, but it 
is also one of the busiest days of the year and more cars are coming. So, 
you let him go.  
Your shift ends, and, as DHS policy requires, you review your 
body camera footage from the day.218 When you come back to the 
footage from your encounter with the student, you remember your 
hunch. You isolate a still photograph of his face and, against DHS 
 
 216. Every year, thousands of Mexican-American families—including this Author’s own—
return to Mexico to celebrate Christmas in their hometowns. Daniel Becerril, This Caravan of 
Migrants Headed South to Mexico—for Christmas, REUTERS (Dec. 26, 2019, 3:09 AM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-mexico/this-caravan-of-migrants-headed-south-to-
mexico-for-christmas-idUSKBN1YU0LN [https://perma.cc/6VXM-BR6M]. However, the traffic 
congestion in early January—when everyone returns from the holidays—makes entry into the 
United States painfully slow. 
 217. Charlotte West, Thousands of Students Cross the U.S.-Mexico Border Every Day To Go 
to College, HECHINGER REP. (June 19, 2019), https://hechingerreport.org/thousands-of-students-
cross-the-southern-border-every-day-to-go-to-college [https://perma.cc/Q9NY-VUKZ]. 
 218. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/CBP/PIA-
052, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE INCIDENT-DRIVEN VIDEO RECORDING SYSTEMS 
(IDVRS) EVALUATION 5 (2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-
cbp052-idvrs-april2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SFR-YGN8]. 
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policy, send it directly to the resident HSI agent so she can run it 
through an FRS.219 First, she submits the image to the standard, 
approved government FRS which displays his visa photograph, driver’s 
license, and images from his border crossings. Unsatisfied, you ask her 
if there is any other FRS she can use. She recalls learning about a new 
commercial FRS the agency had preliminarily contracted with and, 
although the FRS was still in the DHS approval process, she submits 
the photo. Within seconds, the FRS returns dozens of images. One 
group of images appears to be from surveillance camera footage 
because, in the background, you notice different landmarks like the 
local mall, a church, and a school campus.  
One image appears to be his Facebook profile picture, based on 
the link underneath the image. But the largest set of images shows him 
with several groups of people. In some of these images, he is facing the 
camera and wearing a necklace bearing an image of Jesus Malverde—
a religious symbol your training and experience has taught you is 
associated with drug traffickers.220 In another, he appears to be in the 
background and looking slightly away from the camera. In the 
foreground of this image, you notice one man carrying a pistol and 
another man you recognize as a wanted cartel member. You start 
accessing the source links. The first image is from his Facebook profile, 
which is set to private. The other photos all appear on other people’s 
profiles, although he is not tagged in any of them. Based on this 
information, his crossing history, and your training, you suspect he 
might be a drug courier.221 So, you tag the footage as having potential 
evidentiary value and advise co-agents to send the driver to secondary 
the next time he crosses. The whole process takes less than five 
minutes.  
 
 219. ICE agents “must use reasonable efforts to identify the individual” through traditional 
investigation techniques before submitting the image to an FRS. ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra 
note 43, at 6–7. 
 220. See Nathaniel Janowitz, A Narco-Saint, a Death Cult, and a Lost-Cause Apostle Await 
the Pope in Mexico, VICE NEWS (Feb. 11, 2016, 9:45 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/
wja4nb/a-narco-saint-a-death-cult-and-a-lost-cause-apostle-await-the-pope-in-mexico [https:/
/perma.cc/DZ42-5972]. Of course, this is not always the case as many law-abiding Catholics treat 
Jesus Malverde as a saint. Id. However, border officials have treated the observation of Malverde 
as a fact justifying further investigation. E.g., United States v. Valera-Delgado, 547 F. Supp. 2d. 
704, 707–08 (W.D. Tex. 2008). 
 221. Alex Riggins, Former Student Who Recruited Classmates as Cross-Border Drug Mules Sent to 
Prison, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2019, 1:19 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-08-20/chula-
vista-high-schooler-who-recruited-teen-drug-mules-sent-to-prison [https://perma.cc/LNH9-JPYH]. 
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On Monday, he crosses again and is immediately directed to your 
secondary inspection station. You run a drug canine around the car, 
and this time the dog alerts by sitting down. A search reveals a secret 
compartment containing two kilos of heroin. The driver is charged with 
importing narcotics.222 In your report, you note that your suspicion 
arose only after viewing the candidate list returned by the commercial 
FRS.223 The driver moves to suppress the seized drugs on two grounds. 
First, the driver challenges the initial TVS scan that misidentified him 
and sent him to secondary. Second, he challenges your viewing of the 
candidate list returned by the commercial FRS. Both, he alleges, 
constitute illegal searches. Answering either question requires 
applying “the blunt instrument of the Fourth Amendment” to 
technology far beyond anything envisioned by its authors.224 
This Part builds on the hypothetical in two ways, loosely 
corresponding to the two grounds on which the suspect in the 
hypothetical challenged the introduction of drugs as evidence against 
him. It distinguishes between face verification and face identification, 
introduced above,225 to analyze the use of FRT at the border. First, 
Section A argues that the use of TVS for face verification is likely 
permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Second, Section B argues 
that the use of commercial FRS databases for face identification likely 
violates a reasonable expectation of privacy, thus requiring some level 
of suspicion before such a search is permissible under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
A. Face Verification and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy 
The use of facial recognition at the border presents two questions 
relevant to the Fourth Amendment search inquiry. Given facial 
recognition’s primary purpose is to identify people, the first question is 
whether people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
identity, even when subject to the diminished protections at the border. 
Additionally, because FRT can only identify people after analyzing the 
images contained in a comparison database, the second question is 
whether, post-Carpenter, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the images contained within those databases. How these questions 
 
 222. 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (2018).  
 223. A “hunch” is not reasonable suspicion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).  
 224. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 408 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring in part) (criticizing 
the efficacy of applying the Fourth Amendment to modern technology). 
 225. See supra Parts I.A–I.B. 
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are answered depends on whether the FRT is being used for face 
verification or identification. As to the former, the use of FRT for face 
verification is likely not a search under the Fourth Amendment 
because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in identity at the 
border. 
As noted above,226 there is a plausible argument that individuals 
maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their identity as a 
general matter. Social norms reflect a subjective expectation of privacy 
in one’s identity when in public. As Professor Mariko Hirose notes: 
“[W]e invite ‘the intruding eye’ of strangers to glance at or even 
examine our faces as we pass by, but we do not invite them to also 
identify us by our names and addresses, much less occupation, 
immigration status, criminal history, and other personal 
information.”227 Given this social practice—and the fact that law 
enforcement cannot compel someone to identify themselves without 
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing228—this expectation of privacy is 
likely reasonable.  
However, these arguments carry less weight at the border. There, 
anyone seeking to enter the United States must identify themselves 
and demonstrate they are lawfully entitled to enter.229 Those whose 
identities cannot be verified may be denied entry into the country.230 
Normally, this poses no problem under the Fourth Amendment 
because determining a traveler’s admissibility is one of the core 
purposes underlying the border-search exception.231 Travelers seeking 
entry into the United States, therefore, waive any expectation of 
privacy in their identity at the border. However, the emerging use of 
FRT to verify a traveler’s identity may change the constitutional 
calculus. This is because the databases on which FRT relies to be 
effective can reveal personal information unrelated to determining 
 
 226. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.  
 227. Hirose, supra note 101, at 1601. This expectation is arguably diminished in the age of 
social media, on which users regularly disclose private information. See Brian Mund, Note, Social 
Media Searches and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 238, 247–48 
(2017) (describing current caselaw finding no reasonable expectation of privacy for information 
disclosed on social media networks). 
 228. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 188 (2004).  
 229. See generally DHS Inspection of Persons Applying for Admission, 8 C.F.R. § 235.1 
(2020) (outlining the identification requirements “to lawfully enter the United States”). 
 230. See § 235.1(f)(1).  
 231. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) (noting that requirements for 
international travelers to identify themselves are permissible for national self-protection).  
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someone’s admissibility. That is, because the FRT search goes beyond 
the scope of law enforcement’s needs to determine a person’s 
admissibility, and because it may reveal deeply personal information, 
it risks running afoul of the Fourth Amendment. 
CBP’s face verification system, the TVS, likely does not violate a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in third-party data in its current 
form. Similar to the CSLI in Carpenter, the face verification performed 
by the TVS is possible only due to “seismic shifts in digital 
technology.”232 Facial recognition systems analyze a traveler’s facial 
features, create a numerical face template, and compare it against 
other face templates to produce a nearly instantaneous match. But 
there are key differences between the TVS and the technology at issue 
in Carpenter.  
If the TVS is used to perform a one-to-one match, the software 
compares only a travel document and a traveler’s face. Third-party 
records are, by definition, not being accessed, and Carpenter is not 
implicated.233 Even when the TVS accesses third-party records to verify 
a traveler’s identity, those records were likely voluntarily disclosed “in 
[a] meaningful sense.”234 This is so because the TVS accesses images 
from governmental sources like passports, visas, and photos from 
previous border crossings.235 These images are taken only after a 
person takes an affirmative step to disclose their face and identity to 
the government. For example, the student in the above hypothetical 
would have had to apply for a student visa and voluntarily submit his 
photograph to the Department of State.236 There is nothing 
surreptitious about this process. The third-party doctrine likely applies 
to these kinds of images and forecloses any reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  
 
 232. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018). 
 233. Cf. id. at 2223 (finding the warrantless collection of CSLI to be a search, despite the fact 
that the information came from a third party, “[i]n light of [its] deeply revealing 
nature[,] . . . depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach”). 
 234. Id. at 2220 (noting the inescapable nature of CSLI).  
 235. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 236. See Student Visa, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/
study/student-visa.html [https://perma.cc/QNV9-7FJT] (listing a photo as one of the identification 
requirements for a student visa). The same argument applies to images from recent border crossings. 
Cameras are ubiquitous and readily visible at the border. In fact, the City of Laredo uploads live video 
feeds of each border crossing. Laredo, Texas, CITY OF LAREDO, https://www.cityoflaredo.com/
bridgesys/Cameras/bridge4cam.html [https://perma.cc/Q5XP-HG9Y]. Therefore, the decision to cross 
the border forecloses any expectation of privacy in one’s images from those crossings.  
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Finally, these records do not reveal “the privacies of life.”237 If the 
TVS is used to produce a one-to-one match, then the only information 
disclosed to the border officials is that the person presenting herself is 
the same person pictured on her travel document. The personal 
information disclosed to border officials is similarly limited when TVS 
queries a third-party database. Travel document photographs are 
usually taken in a controlled setting and only display the individual’s 
face.238 They typically reveal nothing about a person’s associations, 
political activities, or religious beliefs239—three areas the Court was 
particularly concerned with preserving the privacy of in Carpenter.240  
Although images from border crossings can reveal locational 
information, the inferences that can be drawn from such images are 
limited. A border official viewing these photos would know only when 
and how often a person crosses the border, not where a traveler was 
before reaching the border or where she went after.241 The collection 
of even a large number of images from previous border crossings likely 
does not raise constitutionally significant privacy concerns.242 Applied 
to the hypothetical, such images would only provide a snapshot of the 
student’s movements—far from divulging “the privacies of life.” Given 
the limited scope of the information accessed by the TVS, the use of 
face verification at the border is likely not a search implicating the 
Fourth Amendment. 
 
 237. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014)).  
 238. E.g., Passport Photos, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/
passports/how-apply/photos.html [https://perma.cc/VYR2-NEYK]. 
 239. Of course, there are instances where a travel document may reveal information about 
one’s religious beliefs—such as wearing a necklace or head covering. See id. (“You may not 
wear . . . head coverings, except for religious . . . purposes and with a signed statement.”). That 
information is affirmatively disclosed to the government in those cases. 
 240. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.  
 241. On this issue, Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d 1090 (Mass. 2020), provides a 
useful analogy. In McCarthy, police collected automated-license-plate-reader data from cameras 
stationed at two Cape Cod bridges. Id. at 1095. The court recognized that, while police certainly 
collected a large amount of data, the scope of the information disclosed was fairly limited. See id. 
at 1105–06. Therefore, the images did not reveal “the privacies of life,” and there was no search. 
Id. at 1106. 
 242. Cf. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223 (granting Fourth Amendment protection to CSLI, in 
part, because of “its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach”).  
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B. Face Identification and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy 
Unlike face verification, face identification probably amounts to a 
search because it intrudes on the reasonable expectation of privacy in 
third-party digital records. Like face verification, face identification is 
possible only because of advances in digital technology. But there is a 
constitutionally significant difference between the kinds of records 
accessed during face identification. As currently used by ICE, the 
specific FRS an agent uses will determine the kinds of images she can 
see. Submitting an image to a governmental FRS may access millions 
of face templates generated from passports, driver’s licenses, and 
criminal mugshots.243 There likely is no expectation of privacy in this 
class of images. However, the use of a commercial FRS raises more 
serious Fourth Amendment concerns.  
The implication of a commercial vendor using “internal 
processes” to collect images is that the images used for face 
identification from that vendor will sometimes lack the constitutionally 
required level of voluntariness.244 Consider the issue of surveillance 
camera footage. Commercial vendors can populate their databases 
with images collected from surveillance cameras through contracts 
with private companies and government agencies or through collecting 
the footage themselves.245 These images are often captured 
surreptitiously and without a person’s knowledge.246 Traveling in 
public, of course, exposes one to the risk that she will be seen by others. 
That decision, however, does not equate to an assumption of the risk 
that a private company will compile a “comprehensive dossier of 
[one’s] physical movements.”247 Moreover, how could one even avoid 
that risk? With nearly 70 million active surveillance cameras—roughly 
 
 243. ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 43, at 12–16. 
 244. Cf. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (finding that the collection of CSLI data did not trigger 
the third-party doctrine because Carpenter did not in any meaningful sense voluntarily “assume[] 
the risk” that his locational information would be aggregated (alteration in original) (quoting 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979))). 
 245. See, e.g., Murgia, supra note 73 (describing the creation of an image database by government 
researchers); Jake Satisky, A Duke Study Recorded Thousands of Students’ Faces. Now They’re Being 
Used All over the World, DUKE CHRON. (June 11, 2019, 9:24 PM), https://www.dukechronicle.com/
article/2019/06/duke-university-facial-recognition-data-set-study-surveillance-video-students-china-
uyghur [https://perma.cc/ZHT7-JSFS] (describing how researchers collected images from surveillance 
footage on a university campus). 
 246. See Satisky, supra note 245 (“What they might not have known is that . . . Duke 
researchers were recording them and putting their likenesses into a data set.”).  
 247. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
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one for every four people248—the only real options are to stay home or 
take affirmative steps to defeat facial recognition systems.249 
The practice of collecting images via “searches of open source 
systems” poses similar risks.250 Clearview AI, for example, “scrapes” 
the internet for supposedly “publicly available” images from websites 
like Facebook, LinkedIn, and YouTube, and it compiles them into a 
single database for law enforcement use.251 But just because an image 
is “publicly available” does not mean it was affirmatively disclosed to 
the public. For example, in the above hypothetical, the driver’s 
Facebook profile picture likely was “meaningfully disclosed” since he 
affirmatively uploaded the picture to Facebook.252 But what about the 
images where the driver is with his friends and facing the camera? The 
awareness that his picture was being taken does not necessarily equate 
to consent for his photo to be uploaded to the internet.  
And the picture where he was in the background facing away from 
the camera? Surely, he could not affirmatively disclose a picture he did 
not know was being taken. Even if one lacks an expectation of privacy 
over any single picture, the act of being in public, associating with 
others, and potentially having your picture taken does not necessarily 
equal an assumption of the risk that all of these pictures will be secretly 
collected and aggregated in a database. Regardless, a commercial 
vendor like Clearview AI collects each of these images, without 
 
 248. Liza Lin & Newley Purnell, A World with a Billion Cameras Watching You Is Just 
Around the Corner, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-
billion-surveillance-cameras-forecast-to-be-watching-within-two-years-11575565402 [https://
perma.cc/9B82-XAL6].  
 249. “Defeating” facial recognition refers to measures taken to prevent an FRS from 
identifying someone. This often entails obstructing a clear view of one’s face or interfering with 
an FRT-enabled camera. See COUNTERTERRORISM MISSION CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., VIOLENT ADVERSARIES LIKELY TO USE PROTECTIVE MASKS TO EVADE FACIAL 
RECOGNITION SYSTEMS 1–2 (2020), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6989376-U-
FOUO-in-Violent-Adversaries-Likely-to-Use.html [https://perma.cc/QM52-4E5A] (describing 
methods used to defeat facial recognition).  
 250. See ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 43, at 16 (describing how these systems may 
violate the privacy standards of social media platforms). 
 251. Hill, supra note 13. 
 252. This hypothetical of course assumes the suspect had a certain level of consent to his 
images being online. A much more troubling case would exist in the case of someone who chooses 
not to have an online presence but whose image was captured incidentally in another person’s 
photo and uploaded to the internet.  
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distinction, and displays them to law enforcement.253 This directly 
implicates Carpenter.  
The images displayed by a commercial FRS can collectively reveal 
the “privacies of life” in at least two ways. Commercial FRSs that 
display surveillance camera footage can disclose a person’s locational 
information, depending on the camera’s location.254 With enough 
surveillance footage, a border official could access “a comprehensive 
chronicle of [a person’s] past movements.”255 This, the Court said in 
Carpenter, gives the government “an intimate window into a person’s 
life,” because locational information “reveal[s] . . . ‘familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations.’”256 If both sets reveal 
the same substantive information, it makes little sense to privilege 
locational information revealed directly by CSLI over locational 
information revealed incidentally by FRT.257 
Most importantly—and unlike the CSLI in Carpenter—face 
identification directly reveals the personal information protected 
under Carpenter. For example, ICE acknowledges that it uses 
commercial FRSs that “scrape” social media websites.258 When these 
images are unconstrained, they can display everyone and everything 
contained in the picture. A border official can, as the hypothetical 
illustrates, learn who one’s friends are or simply who is nearby. A 
border official can determine religious or political affiliations based on 
where someone is or what they are wearing. Depending on the number 
of pictures available online, the entirety of a person’s private life could 
be displayed to any border official who decides to use a commercial 
FRS. If individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
locational records because they reveal “the privacies of life” by 
inference, as in Carpenter,259 then images that reveal that same 
 
 253. Hill, supra note 13. 
 254. For example, if you live in Los Angeles, a company could hypothetically contract with 
Caltrans to access its network of CCTV cameras and capture your movements on most freeways. 
Caltrans CCTV Map, CALTRANS, http://cwwp2.dot.ca.gov/vm/iframemap.htm [https://perma.cc/
3JMX-8L9W]. 
 255. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018). 
 256. Id. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012)). 
 257. Moreover, Carpenter did not foreclose the possibility that its reasoning could apply to 
data that reveals location incidentally. See id. at 2220 (“Nor do we address other business records 
that might incidentally reveal location information.”).  
 258. ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 43, at 16. 
 259. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (protecting location records because they “hold for 
many Americans the ‘privacies of life’”). 
JIMENEZ THROUGH FC (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2021  7:59 PM 
2021] FOURTH AMENDMENT AT THE BORDER 1875 
information directly must be entitled to an expectation of privacy. 
Consequently, the use of face identification at the border is a search 
and thus implicates the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment. That conclusion, however, does not determine what level 
of protection the Fourth Amendment offers. 
V.  WHEN IS THE BORDER USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION 
UNREASONABLE? 
Any use of FRT that constitutes a search must ultimately be 
reasonable to pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny.260 In the border 
context, this inquiry begins with a presumption in favor of the 
government’s authority to use FRT without any individualized 
suspicion.261 However, if its use becomes too intrusive on personal 
privacy—determined relative to the sovereign’s security needs—then 
it is a nonroutine search warranting additional Fourth Amendment 
protection.262  
A. Face Verification and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness 
The use of TVS for face verification, as explained above, is most 
likely not a Fourth Amendment search. Therefore, TVS can be used 
without implicating the Fourth Amendment at all.263 Further, even if it 
were a search, it would most likely be a routine search that could be 
conducted without any individualized suspicion. 
Face verification falls within the scope of the border-search 
exception since it substantially furthers the government’s interest in 
determining a traveler’s admissibility. One of the core interests 
underpinning the border-search doctrine is the need to prevent the 
entry of “unwanted persons and effects.”264 An essential corollary to 
that interest is “requiring one entering the country to identify himself 
as entitled to come in.”265 This has traditionally been accomplished by 
 
 260. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (“The Fourth 
Amendment commands that searches and seizures be reasonable.”). 
 261. Id. at 538.  
 262. See id. at 538, 541 (holding that the “detention of a traveler at the border, beyond the 
scope of a routine customs search and inspection” requires reasonable suspicion).  
 263. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 87, at 211 (“[I]f something is not a ‘search’ . . . the Fourth 
Amendment provides no protection at all.”). 
 264. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004).  
 265. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 (1977) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Carroll 
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925)).  
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a border official physically inspecting a traveler’s documentation and 
visually confirming they are the same person. The TVS can identify a 
traveler more quickly and more accurately than a border official can.266  
Additionally, face verification’s intrusion on individual privacy is 
minimal. If the TVS is used for a one-to-one match, the information 
used for verification is restricted to what is contained on a person’s 
travel document. Even when the TVS accesses images in a comparison 
database, the comparison is limited to images where the expectation of 
privacy is minimal—such as other government-issued travel 
documents. CBP’s image-retention policy also places strict time limits 
on the retention of photos collected via the TVS.267 And again, even if 
the use of face verification at the border was a search, it would be more 
akin to a routine border search that could be performed without any 
individualized suspicion.  
B. Face Identification and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness 
The Fourth Amendment analysis for face identification—as 
opposed to face verification—leads to a different conclusion. This 
Section first analyzes the reasonableness of face identification, 
concluding it is unreasonable outside of some individualized suspicion. 
It then discusses what level of individualized suspicion is appropriate 
to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. 
1. Reasonableness Balancing for Face Identification.  Suspicionless 
face identification is unreasonable at the border when it reveals “the 
privacies of life.” The issues associated with face identification parallel 
those associated with electronic-device searches in at least two ways. 
First, this use of FRT does not fit neatly within the scope of the border-
search doctrine. Like the information gleaned from an electronic-
device search, the information revealed by a commercial FRS search, 
such as travel habits, associations, or beliefs, may not directly 
 
 266. See TVS PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 42, at 3 (“[F]acial recognition has presented CBP 
with the best biometric approach because it can be performed relatively quickly, with a high 
degree of accuracy . . . .”); see also U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Changing the Face of Travel 9–
10 (July 2018) (published online by the Electronic Privacy Information Center), https://epic.org/
foia/dhs/cbp/biometric-entry-exit-alt-screening-procedures/Changing-the-Face-of-Travel-Preso-
July2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RR7-LWXZ] (highlighting, inter alia, the faster boarding times 
and up to 98.2 percent match rate associated with FRT). 
 267. See TVS PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 42, at 8–9. 
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determine a person’s admissibility.268 But the information displayed by 
a commercial FRS can certainly be relevant in other ways to furthering 
the government’s interests at the border.269 For example, if the student 
in the hypothetical is admissible on a student visa, but surveillance 
camera footage returned by an FRS suggests he never travels to the 
school, that may be grounds for further questioning.270 Information 
about one’s associations can, as demonstrated in the hypothetical, be 
relevant to determining whether someone might be importing 
contraband or whether they pose a national security threat.  
Second, the intrusion on a traveler’s dignity and privacy interests 
occasioned by face identification is, after Carpenter and Riley, too great 
to be without some level of Fourth Amendment protection. Like 
electronic devices, face identification can reveal information that 
details the full scope of an individual’s private life. An investigating 
border officer can submit someone’s image to a commercial FRS and—
long after a traveler has left the border—examine every aspect of that 
person’s private life. Routine compliance with immigration and 
customs law does not require that level of disclosure.271 This type of 
face recognition thus resembles a nonroutine electronic-device search, 
and its use should be considered unreasonable without some level of 
individualized suspicion. 
2. A Reasonable Suspicion Standard.  Border officials should be 
required to have reasonable suspicion to justify using face 
identification, as opposed to face verification. Following the Fourth 
Circuit’s approach, the standard for reasonable suspicion should be 
that it must pertain to a crime that “bears some nexus to the border 
search exception’s purposes of protecting national security, collecting 
 
 268. Admissibility is conditioned on having legal status to enter the country. Images from 
CCTV and social media will not typically indicate whether someone is legally authorized to enter 
the country.  
 269. See United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713, 721 (4th Cir. 2019) (suggesting that what 
constitutes an evidentiary basis for a specific crime is relevant to individualized suspicion). 
 270. If someone is issued a student visa, one’s ability to work is often restricted, see generally 
Students and Employment, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/working-
united-states/students-and-exchange-visitors/students-and-employment [https://perma.cc/YZ4C-
T8W4]. Violation of those rules can impact a student’s future ability to enter the United States. 
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(G) (2018) (stating that a student visa holder who “violates a term or 
condition of such status” is inadmissible “until the alien has been outside the United States for a 
continuous period of 5 years after the date of the violation”).  
 271. Cf. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d at 720–21 (treating a forensic device search as nonroutine based, 
in part, on the privacy interests implicated by such devices).  
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duties, blocking the entry of unwanted persons, or disrupting efforts to 
export or import contraband.”272 This limitation would keep the rule 
tethered to the purposes underlying the border-search exception.  
Requiring officers to establish reasonable suspicion of 
wrongdoing before they use FRT to conduct face identification should 
be the constitutional floor at the border for several reasons. For one, it 
is the only standard the Supreme Court and courts of appeals have 
suggested would apply at the border for nonroutine searches.273 Plus, 
no lower court that has decided this issue in the electronic-device-
search context has required more than reasonable suspicion.274  
Most importantly, it is arguably the standard that strikes the 
appropriate balance between the government’s security prerogatives 
and individual privacy interests at the border.275 Given the amount of 
contraband entering the United States, and the creative tactics 
employed by smugglers, a higher standard simply might not be 
practical.276 In many cases, there may be enough facts for a border 
official to have reasonable suspicion but not enough to establish 
probable cause.277 And even if probable cause could accommodate the 
needs of border officials, Riley and Carpenter both contemplate that 
 
 272. Id. at 721. 
 273. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 540–41 (1985); cf. United 
States v. Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d 287, 291 (5th Cir. 2018) (“For border searches both routine and 
not, no case has required a warrant.”). The Supreme Court expressly rejected other amorphous 
standards such as “clear indication” or “plain suggestion.” See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 
at 536, 540–41 (“We do not think that the Fourth Amendment’s emphasis upon reasonableness is 
consistent with the creation of a third verbal standard in addition to ‘reasonable suspicion’ and 
‘probable cause’; we are dealing with a constitutional requirement of reasonableness, not mens 
rea . . . .”). 
 274. See, e.g., United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, 
No. 20-1043 (U.S. Jan. 29, 2021) (reasonable suspicion applies); see also United States v. Wanjiku, 
919 F.3d 472, 485 (7th Cir. 2019) (“[N]o circuit court, before or after Riley, has required more 
than reasonable suspicion for a border search of cell phones or electronically-stored data.”). 
 275. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 (“The ‘reasonable suspicion’ 
standard . . . effects a needed balance between private and public interests when law enforcement 
officials must make a limited intrusion on less than probable cause.”).  
 276. See, e.g., id. at 541–43 (noting “alimentary canal smuggling at the border . . . gives no 
external signs and inspectors will rarely possess probable cause to arrest or search”). For an 
insight into the contraband seized at the border to date, see CBP Enforcement Statistics Fiscal 
Year 2021, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT. [hereinafter CBP 2021 Statistics], https://
www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics [https://perma.cc/C7YB-Q65M]. 
 277. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541–43.  
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different contexts might require different standards.278 Given that 
probable cause has never been applied to searches at the border,279 it is 
difficult to imagine a standard higher than reasonable suspicion 
without direction from the Supreme Court. 
To be sure, the reasonable suspicion standard is not without flaws. 
Reasonable suspicion, some argue, does little to prevent “arbitrary, 
discriminatory, and harassing searches,”280—especially considering the 
judicial deference afforded to the training and experience of border 
officials.281 Because the reasonable suspicion standard offers little 
substantive protection, they argue only probable cause is appropriate 
after Riley and Carpenter.282 However, courts routinely employ the 
reasonable suspicion standard to suppress evidence and check 
government overreach.283 This standard, while not perfect, offers a 
baseline level of protection against completely suspicionless 
searches.284 That is the “very evil the Fourth Amendment was intended 
to stamp out.”285  
 
 278. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 
373, 401–02 (2014) (“[O]ther case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a 
particular phone.”). 
 279. Probable cause has been applied to searches and seizures near the border. See, e.g., 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881–82 (1975) (holding that an officer on roving 
patrol may question suspects about their citizenship status or any suspicious circumstance,  
“but any further detention or search must be based on consent or probable cause”). What 
standard might apply in those contexts is beyond the scope of this Note.  
 280. E.g., Christopher I. Pryby, Note, Forensic Border Searches After Carpenter Require 
Probable Cause and a Warrant, 118 MICH. L. REV. 507, 527 (2019). 
 281. See, e.g., Abidor v. Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Reasonable 
suspicion is a relatively low standard and border officials are afforded deference due to their 
training and experience.” (citing Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 542)). 
 282. E.g., Pryby, supra note 280, at 520–30 (“[T]he government must develop probable cause 
and obtain a warrant before performing a forensic search of an electronic device at the border.”); 
Donohue, Customs, Immigration, and Rights, supra note 158, at 1014. One recent article questions 
the historical assumptions underlying suspicionless searches of electronic devices, see generally 
Note, The Border Search Muddle, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2278 (2019). 
 283. In the border context, courts have suppressed evidence discovered when officers had 
little more than vague suspicions of wrongdoing. See, e.g., United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 
713, 723–24 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding reasonable suspicion did not exist simply because the agent 
“had a concern” that an electronic device “might” contain child pornography); United States v. 
Puga, No. 5:19-CR-1346-1, 2019 WL 7170623, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 24, 2019) (holding a 911 call 
“that vaguely reported ‘suspicious’ behavior” does not amount to reasonable suspicion).  
 284. See, e.g., Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d at 723–24 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding reasonable suspicion did 
not exist simply because the agent “had a concern” that an electronic device “might” contain child 
pornography). 
 285. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 858 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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3. A Source Rule for Face Identification at the Border.  The Riley 
Court recognized the importance of fashioning legal doctrine that 
“provide[s] clear guidance to law enforcement through categorical 
rules.”286 The need for a categorical rule is especially important for the 
use of face identification at the border. For some of the databases used 
by border officials employing FRT, there might not be a reasonable 
expectation of privacy at all. As the hypothetical demonstrates, there 
may be a reasonable expectation of privacy over some sets of images 
but not others. A subjective standard is superficially appealing: when 
the government “learns something invasive, a search has occurred.”287 
But an officer might not know whether a set of images is “invasive” 
before conducting the search or until additional facts are known.288  
Similarly, drawing a mosaic-theory line based on when the amount 
of information collected becomes too intrusive is also unclear.289 The 
number of photos displayed to an officer is tied to the amount 
contained in the underlying database and the confidence interval set 
by the officer.290 A face identification search could potentially return 
hundreds of images from different sources. Is that unreasonable? What 
if an FRS returned hundreds of photos, but only from a traveler’s 
border crossings? And as the hypothetical demonstrated, an FRT 
search might display only a small number of images that each directly 
reveal private information. Would that search be unreasonable? Such 
a line-drawing expedition will inevitably result in arbitrary decisions 
about what constitutes a reasonable search.291 
 
 286. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 398 (2014). 
 287. KERR, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 111 (manuscript at 28). 
 288. Cf. Riley, 573 U.S. at 399 (declining to adopt a rule permitting an officer to search for 
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest, officer safety, or an arrestee’s identity because it would 
“impose few meaningful constraints on officers . . . and officers would not always be able to 
discern in advance what information would be found where”). For a helpful illustration of this 
issue, see KERR, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 111 (manuscript at 29–34).  
 289. The “mosaic theory” of the Fourth Amendment posits that even if certain information, 
on its own, is not entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy, the aggregation of such 
information might trigger the Fourth Amendment. See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory 
of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012) (analyzing the implications of a mosaic 
theory of the Fourth Amendment). In practice, this approach also poses difficult line-drawing 
questions. See id. at 343–50 (describing the “mosaic theory” as a “vague middle ground”). 
 290. See, e.g., supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text; Satisky, supra note 245 (describing a 
data set with “more than 2 million image frames of around 2,000 students from eight cameras 
placed around [Duke’s] campus”).  
 291. Compare Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 n.3 (2018) (“It is sufficient for 
our purposes today to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment 
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A bright-line standard, however, suffers from the risk of being 
overinclusive. The reasonable suspicion standard would apply to an 
entire database simply because it contains images that could reveal 
“the privacies of life.”292 But the images returned for any one individual 
might not actually reveal information that private. The reasonable 
suspicion standard would apply even if a database contained no images 
of a particular person. But as the Court stated in Arizona v. Hicks,293 
“[a] search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the 
bottom of a turntable.”294  
Though it is beyond the scope of this Note to suggest a full-fledged 
doctrine, a per se rule based on whether the source database contains 
any protected third-party information, such as the information in many 
commercial FRSs, might be the most administrable standard.295 Under 
this approach, border officials would have clear guidance. If officials 
have reasonable suspicion of any crime related to the border 
exception’s underlying purposes—such as drug trafficking—they could 
use a commercial FRS without fear that any derivative evidence will be 
tainted.296 Courts would not need to split hairs evaluating when the 
information revealed became too intrusive. The court would need to 
evaluate only the merits of the officer’s reasonable suspicion.297 Lastly, 
travelers would have at least some assurance that border officers could 
not peer into their private lives without a measure of suspicion giving 
them a reason to do so. 
In the end, classifying the use of facial identification at the border 
as a nonroutine search is not a cure-all. In many cases, border officials 
will satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard and gain a window into 
 
search.”), with id. at 2267 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Why seven days instead of ten or three or 
one?”).  
 292. See KERR, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 111 (manuscript at 40). 
 293. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987). 
 294. Id. at 325.  
 295. See KERR, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 111 (manuscript at 40–42) (“The most 
administrable way to implement a test that treats digital surveillance as a search . . . is to treat the 
fruits of digital surveillance as categorically different.”). 
 296. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963) (holding evidentiary fruits 
of a Fourth Amendment violation are, generally, inadmissible as “fruit of the poisonous tree”). 
Though this fear is likely diminished given the expansion of the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule. See, e.g., United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713, 725 (4th Cir. 2019) 
(affirming the suppression motion’s denial based on the good-faith exception). 
 297. Compare United States v. Wanjiku, 919 F.3d 472, 487–89 (7th Cir. 2019) (concluding 
reasonable suspicion existed), with Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d at 723–24 (concluding officer lacked 
reasonable suspicion). 
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our lives. Albeit imperfect, the reasonable suspicion standard places at 
least some obstacle in the way of a “too permeating police 
surveillance” and safeguards “‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary 
power.’”298 When applying “the blunt instrument of the Fourth 
Amendment,” that sometimes is the best for which one can hope.299 
CONCLUSION 
Facial recognition technology is already being used to support 
enforcement operations at the border.300 Considering the sheer amount 
of contraband seized at the border, it is only a matter of time before a 
scenario like the one described in this Note plays out in a federal 
courthouse.301 When it does, federal courts should proceed carefully to 
avoid “uncritically extend[ing] existing precedents,” which the Court 
warned against in Carpenter and Riley.302 Unfortunately, the Fourth 
Amendment claims calling for limits on FRT at the border will 
probably only arise during suppression hearings involving “not very 
nice people.”303 Given FRT’s obvious benefits, courts might be tempted 
to shoehorn the use of FRT into the routine border-search doctrine.  
But consider again the San Ysidro Port of Entry. The 
overwhelming majority of the nearly one hundred thousand people 
who enter this country are not importing contraband or otherwise 
violating the law. Crossing the border, for many of them, is part of daily 
life. They travel between San Diego and Tijuana to work, study, and 
visit family. Countless others are merely passing through to pursue the 
American Dream in places like Salinas, California; Amarillo, Texas; 
and Nashville, Tennessee.304 Whatever their connection to the border, 
each and every one of them is entitled to the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection—regardless of the efficiency that modern technology offers. 
After all, the border should be a gateway, not an “authoritarian twilight 
zone.”305 
 
 298. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (emphasis added).  
 299. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 408 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring in part). 
 300. Emily Birnbaum, CBP Identifies over 100 ‘Imposters’ out of 19 Million with Face Scans at 
Airports, Border, HILL (June 14, 2019, 3:57 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/transportation/448643-cbp-
says-it-has-caught-over-100-imposters-out-of-19-million-scanned-by [https://perma.cc/T4P4-DGJF].  
 301. In fiscal year 2020, CBP seized 533,708 pounds of illegal narcotics. See CBP 2021 
Statistics, supra note 276. 
 302. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222 (citing Riley, 573 U.S. at 386).  
 303. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  
 304. A journey familiar to this Author’s own parents.  
 305. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 564 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
